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Environmental 
factors, crisis 
in the centres and 
change in 
international 
relations of the 
peripheral countries 
Luciano Tomassini 
On the basis of ideas put forward in previous studies, 
the author continues his exploration of the changes 
which have occured in international relations during 
the past few decades, with the aim of substantiating 
his thesis that the developing countries should di-
rect their course towards a strategy of selective 
participation in the international system. 
He begins by evaluating the ideas which, since 
the post-war period, have been advanced to interpret 
centre-periphery relations, and shows how some of 
them have been left behind by reality. Going more 
deeply into the real processes concerned, he devotes 
attention to the structural changes which have taken 
place in the developed and developing countries; in 
the case of the former he studies the formation and 
crisis of the transnational system, while with respect 
to the latter he refers in particular to the patterns and 
implications of their economic development. 
In the last part of the article, he alludes to the 
general process of economic internationalization 
and proposes some ways of integrating the develop-
ing countries in the world economy, In his opinion, 
these countries ought to choose strategies which 
imply neither passive subordination to external 
economic forces nor the replacement of interna-
tional markets by centralized mechanisms, but aim 
at securing selective insertion in the world system. 
*CEPAL Regional Advisor on Internationa! Economic 
Negotiations, 
Introduction 
T h e purpose of these pages is to help to eluci-
date certain questions connected with recent 
trends in the international relations of the 
peripheral countries in the light of the new 
perspectives opened up by a set of factors 
which will doubtless be recalled for the in-
creasing weight they will have carried during 
the last third of the twentieth century: factors 
which are responsible for the strengthening of 
the links of interdependence in the interna-
tional system, and among which environmental 
considerations take an outstanding place.1 
In line with the tradition of CEPAL thin-
king, as regards what in our opinion constitute 
its fundamental theses, recognition is accorded 
at the outset to the importance of centre-peri-
phery relations in the evolution of the develop-
ing countries; to the structural dependence of 
these latter on the main cyclical centre, cons-
tituted by the developed countries; and to the 
tendency towards deterioration in their terms 
of trade, or, in more general terms, their de-
clining participation in the benefits deriving 
from their economic relations with the indus-
trial centres. 
The changes undergone by these relations 
in the course of the past decade are next ex-
plored, and some modifications are suggested 
that should be introduced into CEPAL's inter-
pretative hypotheses based on the post-war 
'The present article follows up some lines of thought 
started in a paper by O. Sunkel and L. Tomassini, entitled 
"La dimension ambiental y el cambio en las relaciones 
internacionales d e los países en desarrollo", which was 
presented at a seminar on Development Styles and Envi-
ronment in Latin America, and of which a revised version 
was published in Estudios Internacionales, No. 50, April-
June 1980. The discussion of certain specific aspects of 
ecological problems considered in the paper in question, 
such as environmental pollution, energy, natural resources 
and industrial redeployment, is omitted here, since several 
of them are dealt with in other contributions included in 
this same issue of the Review. Analysis of the alternatives 
that the existence of these factors poses from the angle oí 
national development strategies is also omitted. The pre-
sent reflections concentrate on their implications from the 
standpoint of the form that will probably be taken by the 
developing countries' international relations. The author 
wishes to lay stress on the inspiration he has drawn from 
dialogue with Osvaldo Sunkel, but assumes full responsi-
bility for the analysis carried out subsequently to the 
above-mentioned paper and, in particular, for any errors 
that the present may contain. 
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situation, in view of the changes brought about 
since then in the international system —and 
above all in the advanced capitalist countries— 
by the impact of what for the sake of brevity we 
shall term the Antonine syndrome.2 Among the 
interpretations corresponding to historical cir-
cumstances which have changed during the 
past few years are those relating ot the 'delin-
king' of the peripheral countries from the world 
economy, to their unilateral dependence upon 
the industrial countries, to the irreversible 
nature of the features noted, to the emphasis on 
international trade as a nexus between the two 
segments of the system and to the monolithic 
character of the so-called hegemonic centre.3 
Here it is proposed to draw a distinction bet-
ween the central theses of CEPAL thinking 
with regard to the importance, structure and 
general modus operandi of the centre-peri-
phery system, viewed in a broad historical per-
spective, and some interpretative hypotheses 
through which it was sought to describe the 
peculiar characteristics presented by centre-
periphery relations in a given period. In other 
words, an attempt will be made to ensure that 
perception of the system's structural features 
does not preclude awareness of the change that 
2 In his theory on the downfall of civilizations, resulting 
from their loss of dominion over their physical and human 
environment, the deterioration of their capacity tor creative 
self-government and the propensity to mimesis as a me-
chanism for the diffusion of social patterns, Toynbee finds 
that in the case of the Roman Empire this constellation of 
circumstances occurs in the time of the Antonini, at the very 
height of the apparent apogee of hellenistic civilization. 
Another classic historian saw in the world of the Antonini 
" the least bad of the possible worlds" in ancient times, and 
based his opinion on the constant threat of economic diffi-
culties, on the changes in values and on the sufferings 
endured by the poorest groups in several regions. If a cause 
for this situation is sought, it may be discovered in the 
inadaptability of the social structure and social life to the 
real economic necessities of the Roman world (Crouzet, 
1958). The simile used here for purely semantic purposes 
may have a certain applicability to the situation today, 
according to some historians of culture (U. Eco, 1973; R. 
Vacca, 1975; A. Stavrios, 1976; and others), for whom the 
crisis of the pax americana, the fragmentation and privati-
zation of power, ecological deterioration, neonomadism 
and the recrudescense of insecuritas and, therefore, of 
auctoritas, would seem to be jeopardizing the worldwide 
expansion of capitalism, and presaging the emergence of a 
new Middle Ages. 
3 Thus , for example, in this last connexion the CEPAL 
analysis first drew attention to the replacement of the Uni-
the relations in question have undergone; and 
to do so more forcefully a two-edged weapon 
will be used, which consists in emphasizing 
the chiaroscuros presented by the questions 
discussed, with the drawback that the available 
space for dealing with them will barely be 
enough for the enunciation of a few con-
clusions. 
To go straight to the heart of our central 
conclusion, we will hazard the hypothesis that 
the Antonine syndrome —the interruption of 
the expansionary cycle of the world economy, 
uncertainty with respect to supplies of certain 
strategic natural resources and the transfor-
mation of values in an increasing number of 
social groups, all of which have affected the 
great industrial centres after a period of 
unprecedented prosperity— is bringing about 
a modification of the former international divi-
sion of labour on which centre-periphery rela-
tions were based, and is confronting the peri-
phery with and unheard-of combination of risks 
and opportunities. It is thus faced with the 
necessity of pursuing its historical path towards 
development in a considerably altered interna-
tional scenario. 
In accordance with a maxim coined in the 
United States to justify the theory of spill-over 
as a solution for the problems posed by the 
asymmetry in the aforesaid relations, it was 
long maintained that what was good for the 
centre was good for the periphery. In the 
course of recent years, some analysts began to 
wonder whether the prosperity of the indus-
trialized countries could be maintained with-
out progress on the part of the developing 
countries, and propounded the hypothesis that 
what was good for the periphery ought also to 
be good for the centre (Sewell, 1978 and 1979). 
In the present article another possibility is ex-
ted Kingdom by the United States as the leading hege-
monic centre, later to the appearance of subcentres repre-
sented by the European Economic Community and Japan, 
and, lastly, to the emergence of the socialist countries as an 
additional pole of the world economic system. It will pre-
sently be argued that it is possible to perceive similar 
changes with respect to other features that characterized in 
their time the interpretative system formulated by CEPAL 
at the beginning of the post-war period (see, inter alios, 
Pinto, 1973). 
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plored that is suggested by the problems of 
today, namely, that what is bad for the centre 
might be good for the periphery. 
The elements in the Antonine syndrome 
which might lead to this conclusion are not, oí 
course, confined within the bounds of interna-
tional economic relations, and spring from the 
global evolution of the societies concerned. It 
is necessary, therefore, to follow the path 
1. From the theory of co-operation to the 
analysis of the centre-periphery system 
T h e interest of the international community in 
the underdeveloped countries was first awak-
ened after the Second World War. It was, in a 
measure, the result of the decolonization pro-
cess which started at the time and of the strug-
gle of the great powers to extend their fields of 
influence into the Third World, as an integral 
part of the cold war. Thus concern about under-
development came into being, and with it the 
first external aid programmes. 
Underlying this process there was a series 
of theories on the nature of development and 
on the most appropriate strategies to promote 
it. The common denominator of these concep-
tions was the assimilation of the concept of 
'development ' to that of 'modernization'. De-
velopment was envisaged as a univocal pro-
cess, necessarily passing through pre-estab-
lished stages, in pursuit of a path along which 
all countries alike must travel. The difference 
be tween development and underdevelopment 
lay in the fact that some countries had followed 
this road earlier while others had barely got 
beyond its first milestones. To account for this 
situation some theories place the emphasis on 
the structure of personality (Riesman, 1951; 
McClelland, 1961; and Hagen, 1962); others 
stress the role of social value or preferences 
(essentially Parson and Shils, 1952, and the 
original Latin American version by Germani, 
traced by Raúl Prebisch when, referring to his 
recent articles, he said: "I have sought to arrive 
at a global interpretation which embraces the 
most important factors of development. They 
are economic, technological, social, cultural 
and political factors. To propose to explain real-
ity in the light of a purely economic theory is to 
find oneself hopelessly trapped in a blind al-
ley" (1978). 
1962); others again underline the structural 
conditions that would have to be fulfilled to 
make sustained economic growth possible 
(Rostow, 1960). In all these approaches, the 
accent is placed on the need for modernization, 
this being understood as imitation of a model 
coined by the countries which were the prota-
gonists of the industrial revolution and are now 
developed. The possibility was never even 
mooted that the causes of underdevelopment 
might lie precisely in the nature of the prevail-
ing relations between the backward societies 
and the industrialized countries; a sort of "nat-
ural harmony of interests" between the two 
groups of countries was presumed to exist. The 
development of the backward countries was to 
be substantially induced by the spill-over from 
the economic growth of the great industrial 
centres. The existence of a profound gap bet-
ween the two categories of countries was re-
cognized, and so was the marked asymmetry in 
their political, military and economic relations, 
but this situation was attributed to the fact that 
the countries in question were at different 
"stages of development" It should be the part 
of international co-operation to help to bridge 
that gap and to encourage the development of 
the backward countries. The international co-
operation programmes which were launched 
4
 This section is based on the first part of the paper by 
Sunkel and Tomassini referred toas having been published 
in Estudios ¡rite mac tonale s. No. 50 (1980). 
I 
The evolution of the frame of interpretation of 
centre-periphery relations^ 
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on the basis of these assumptions did not pro-
duce the expected results, and the period ex-
tending up to the close of the 1960s terminated 
in a mood of shear 'disillusionment with aid', 
testimony to which is to be found in a number 
of evaluations formulated at the end of the pe-
riod, as well as in the reports prepared by Pear-
son, Peterson and Prebisch.5 
"Donors and recipients alike" (one such 
report concludes) "tended to view the mo-
dernization and development of low-in-
come countries as an attempt to repeat the 
Industrial Revolution in quick time. They 
focused inordinate attention on individual 
investment projects and relatively little on 
the causes and results of stagnation" (Pear-
son, 1969, p. 5). 
That approach overlooked the historical 
background and structural characteristics that 
had shaped, in the course of time, the relations 
be tween the underdeveloped and industrial-
ized countries. It assumed that development 
was a process that could take place indepen-
dently and in the same way in different places 
and at different times, and that it consisted in 
reproducing, in different circumstances, a pre-
established model. In this sense, it helped to 
endorse the primacy of the industrial powers, 
and to consolidate an international system 
constructed in their image and likeness. 
CEPAL called these assumptions in ques-
tion from the very outset of its activities, about 
the beginning of the 1950s under the leader-
ship of Raúl Prebisch. In CEPAL's view under-
development did not consist merely in the lack 
of growth but, on the contrary, constituted the 
style of growth peculiar to the peripheral econ-
omies. Its analysis contained from the start the 
e lements which, with the passage of time, were 
to affirm the existence of a world economic 
system that simultaneously generated develop-
ment in the centres and underdevelopment in 
the periphery (CEPAL, 1950; Prebisch, 1952). 
^ For a critical analysis of these and other similar re-
ports, see Helio Jaguaribe, "Implicaciones políticas de! 
desarrollo latinoamericano", in Díaz-Alejandro, et al., 
1976. 
According to this analysis, the 'centre' 
(made up of the developed countries) had es-
tablished an international division of labour 
whereby it reserved for itself the production of 
manufactures and capital goods, and assigned 
to the 'periphery' (the underdeveloped coun-
tries) the role of producers of foodstuffs and raw 
materials. In the framework of this type of spe-
cialization, the international markets systema-
tically operated against the interests of the de-
veloping countries, giving rise to a secular 
trend towards the deterioration of their terms of 
trade and of their capacity to import, as well as 
to persistent external imbalances. 
The trend in question consisted in that 
over the long term the prices of the primary 
commodities which the peripheral countries 
specialized in exporting declined in compari-
son with those of the manufactures and capital 
goods which they had to import from the cen-
tres. This was due in the first place to the fact 
that, as could soon be seen, the entrepreneurial 
and labour sectors in the industrialized coun-
tries, instead of transferring to the periphery 
the benefits deriving from productivity incre-
ments induced by technical progress, through a 
correlative reduction of prices, converted them 
into a steady rise in their own income. A second 
contributory cause was that demand for prima-
ry commodities is relatively inelastic, as can be 
inferred from Engels Law, according to which 
the more the income of a society increases (as 
occurs in the centres) the smaller is the propor-
tion that the consumer allocates to food and 
basic commodities, which means that the 
growth of demand for products of this type is 
slow and irregular. Thirdly, the same effect is 
produced by certain characteristic biases in 
modern tecnology, which tends to encourage 
the generalized substitution of synthetic for 
natural products, and material-saving produc-
tion processes. The protection that the indus-
trialized countries have traditionally accorded 
to their primary sectors, by making access to 
their markets difficult for the commodities in 
which the periphery specializes, did the rest.*5 
6
 As has been pointed out elsewhere, this line of analy-
sis, originally minted in Latin America, attained world-
wide currency as trom 1964, when it inspired the proposi-
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From the standpoint of the developed 
countries, it was only to be expected that such 
theses should be contested. Thus, for example, 
the t rend towards deterioration of the terms of 
trade has more than once been called in ques-
tion in the light of empirical evidence (Ells-
worth, 1956; Flanders, 1964; and Haberler, 
1969). In broad outlines, however, the argu-
ment still holds good, especially if its validity is 
measured not so much in terms of the real evo-
lution of basic commodity prices as in relation 
to the trend which the developing countries 
had reason to trust they would follow (Fishlow, 
1978). Nevertheless, in the context of the pres-
ent discussion, it is worthwhile enquiring into 
whether some of the assumptions on which this 
theory was historically based are still valid. 
2. The advance of the transnationalization 
process at world level 
The centre-periphery scheme of analysis 
was based on the assumption that both the role 
assigned in the international division of labour 
to the peripheral countries —that of producers 
of raw materials— and the trend towards delin-
king of their economies from the international 
economic system, reflected in their declining 
participation in world trade, would be irrever-
sible. The industrialization of the peripheral 
countries and the conclusion of commodity 
agreements emerged in the light of this analy-
sis as the two paths which, by modifying the 
developing countries' specialization in the in-
ternational division of labour and improving 
their terms of trade, would lead them towards 
the acquisition of a larger share in the fruits of 
technical progress. The drastic reduction in the 
purchasing power of their exports resulting 
from the depression of the 1930s, and the addi-
tional difficulties in importing caused by the 
war, afforded these countries new incentives to 
adopt policies that would protect and encour-
i o n s formulated by the developing countries in UNCTAD. 
Indeed , it served as the basis for the new trade strategy of 
the Third World (Prebisch, 1964). But these notes refer 
only to the change in the conceptual interpretation of cen-
tre-periphery relations, and exclude questions relating to 
the strategies that have oriented negotiations between the 
two groups of countries (Tomassini, 1967 and 1969). 
age the creation of an industrial sector which, 
in an initial stage, was based on deliberate po-
licies of 'inward-directed growth' and import 
substitution, and to insist on the necessity of 
regulating the raw materials markets. 
The supposition that the delinking bet-
ween the peripheral countries and the interna-
tional economy was irreversible was based on a 
number of postulates, which included the exis-
tence of an extremely rigid international hier-
archy, the predominance of security objectives 
over economic interests (two assumptions 
linked with the cold war) and the existence of a 
poorly integrated international economy, in 
which the mobility of factors was much less 
than that of goods. The events of the following 
decade made a difference to these assump-
tions. The relative weakening of the rigidly 
bipolar system which stemmed from the Se-
cond World War and the trend towards the dis-
persion of world economic power strengthened 
the capacity for manoeuvre and the competi-
tiveness of the developing countries, led to the 
diversification of the markets and of the sources 
of supply of capital goods, technology and fi-
nancing which were available to them, and, 
therefore, acted as a spur to their integration in 
the international system. The fact that econom-
ic interests came to acquire increasing impor-
tance in international relations in comparison 
with security objectives also helped to flexibil-
ize the participation of the developing coun-
tries in the international system, and encour-
aged them to seek a higher degree of autonomy, 
since economic power is relatively less concen-
trated than political and military sway. The 
trend towards the formation of a transnational 
economic system based on increasing interde-
pendence among the various national societies, 
in which the internationalization of trade and of 
primary production was followed by that of in-
dustrial production and services, did still more 
to incorporate the peripheral countries in a 
global system that was being rapidly consoli-
dated.7 The hardening of East-West relations 
that has taken place since last year may repre-
sent a set-back rather than a definitive change 
7 See, primarily, such authors as Bergsten and Krause, 
1975; Cooper, 1968; and Nye and Keohane, 1975. 
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of direction on the road towards détente, if ac-
count is taken of the structural characteristics of 
the chief contestants and the nature of the eco-
nomic and technological relations that have al-
ready grown up between them; and it is in any 
case too recent an episode to give grounds for 
drawing lasting conclusions. 
"The centre-periphery approach has been 
very useful in explaining the historical 
background of the capitalist development 
of the periphery in terms of the characteris-
tics of the corresponding centres in their 
phases of expansion and crisis (as is point-
ed out by some of the authors who have 
done most to enlarge upon this approach). 
Thus, for example, it is recognized that the 
spread of the industrial revolution and the 
imperialist expansion of the central coun-
tries during the latter part of the nine-
teenth century were the factors that contri-
buted most to the peripheral countries' 
conversion into specialized exporters of 
primary commodities. Furthermore, it is 
admitted that the period of crisis through 
which capitalism passed between the First 
World War and the 1940s was one of the 
determinants of the industrialization of ma-
ny countries at that time underdeveloped. 
Nevertheless, except in the restricted con-
text of the importance attaching to external 
markets for basic commodities, capital and 
technology, and of the growth experienced 
by the transnational corporations since the 
Second World War, to which attention has 
been drawn in the literature on depen-
dence, the analysis of the peripheral coun-
tries ' development in the last two decades 
in frequently conducted as if that global 
capitalist framework had ceased to exist, 
had remained essentially unchanged, or 
was of no importance." (Sunkel and Fuen-
zalida, 1978.) 
The past decade witnessed the gradual 
working-out of a schema centred on the 
analysis of a transnational set-up in which the 
central and peripheral countries are not only 
linked by external relations, which pertain to 
the sphere of the goods and factors markets, but 
form part of one and the same system, whose 
features radically determine the peripheral 
countrie's political, economic, social and cul-
tural structure. The centre-periphery analysis 
had primarily focused attention on the trade 
relations between the two groups of countries, 
since they were considered to be the main form 
of linkage between the two segments of the 
system. It had also predicted that the indus-
trialization of the periphery, by modifying its 
specialization in the international division of 
labour, would necessarily engender a more au-
tonomous form of growth. The fact that the in-
dustrialization of the peripheral countries took 
place during a stage characterized by the trans-
national organization of the world economy 
somewhat affected the validity of these diag-
noses and the corresponding predictions. In 
reality, the process in question was not carried 
out in isolation, but made progress thanks to the 
establishment of new and deep-rooted con-
nexions with foreign economies. In other 
words, the development of the peripheral 
countries incorporated them in the external 
economy more closely and in different ways, as 
they gradually replaced imports of consumer 
goods by those of the capital goods and inputs 
they required to pursue their industrialization 
processes, and assimilated the ways of life, the 
consumption patterns and the structures of pro-
duction proper to advanced societies, en-
hancing the strength and complexity of their 
interrelationships with a booming transna-
tional system. To put it another way, the de-
velopment of the peripheral countries went 
hand in hand with their increasing integration 
in the international systems. 
"It is a fact" —according to an authoritative 
testimony— "that the Latin American coun-
tries have developed within the context of 
growing integration in the international eco-
nomy. Although external factors have always 
been of decisive importance in the evolution of 
the region, the presetit extent and characteris-
tics of its external relations are new". (Iglesias, 
1980.) 
This state of affairs involves imitative 
adoption by the peripheral countries of the 
style of development prevailing in the centres. 
In this process a very important role is played 
by the transnational groups operating in the 
developing countries, since their goal is to 
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reproduce that style locally, organizing the so-
cieties of the periphery in the image and like-
ness of the centres. The transnational integra-
tion of the peripheral countries strengthens the 
tendency for 'transnationalized' sectors to exist 
in their economies alongside marginal sectors. 
It also permits the subsistence of a high degree 
of asymmetry —and, therefore, of dependence 
and conflict— between the various segments of 
the system. Yet, without regard to these nega-
tive connotations, the trans nationalization of 
the peripheral countries is being intensified. 
3. Crisis in the system and interdependence 
The period of exceptional prosperity enjoyed 
by the great industrial countries during the 
1950s and 1960s undoubtedly provided the 
background that made the formation of the 
system possible, as well as the progressive 
transnational integration of the peripheral 
countries. In the course of time, however, the 
costs, the contradictions and the undesirable 
effects of the process became increasingly ap-
parent. The 1970s were marked by the down-
turn of the expansionary cycle in the centres. 
This situation determined the evolution of the 
world economy as a whole, which has been 
characterized since then by insecurity with 
respect to supplies of energy and other stra-
tegic raw materials, by conditions of acute 
instability and by chronic inflationary and 
recessive trends. Hence it is that this last 
period has witnessed an ever-deepening 
awareness that economic growth has its limits. 
T h e first report on these problems published 
under the auspices of the Club of Rome helped 
to launch a debate which generated a number 
of different reactions on the theoretical plane, 
while the action taken by OPEC in 1973 gave 
the alarm in the field of actual fact (Meadows et 
al, 1972; The Ecologist, 1972; Ward, 1973; 
Mesarovic and Pestel, 1974; Heilbroner, 1974; 
Kahn et al, 1976; Herrera et al, 1976; Mishan, 
1977; and Freeman and Jahoda, 1978). 
This awareness is associated with certain 
trends observable in the centres, to which the 
following section refers, and outstanding 
among which are the increase in the opera-
tional costs of their production systems in 
consequence of wage adjustments and rising 
public expenditure; the changes in labour force 
and consumer preferences; the diminishing ra-
tes of return on investment; and the slackening 
of the pace of technological innovation, inter 
alia. It is also tied up with the higher prices and 
uncertain supply of energy and other industrial 
raw materials, and with the need to face in-
creasing environmental costs, in consequence 
of the tempo, style and degree of concentration 
of economic growth in the centres. From one 
point of view, these trends have brought in 
their train the consolidation of a transnational 
system based on the gradual interpénétration 
of national societies. From another, they cons-
titute factors that are making for a loss of 
competitive capacity on the part of a growing 
number of economic activities in the industrial 
countries, and are exerting pressure in favour of 
changes in the former international division of 
labour. 
Hence these factors are altering the terms 
in which centre-periphery relations have tradi-
tionally been stated. Hitherto these relations 
had been envisaged in terms of the clash of 
interest between two groups of countries oc-
cupying clearly defined positions in the inter-
national division of labour. In this set-up, the 
developing countries were struggling to im-
prove their share in the distribution of the 
benefits deriving from international economic 
relations, and trying to get the industrialized 
countries to adopt concessional or preferential 
measures designed to promote a process of uni-
lateral transfer of resources to the periphery. It 
was not clearly realized that the welfare of each 
of these two groups of countries depended, to 
some extent, on the progress of all and on the 
operation of the world economy as a whole. 
Today, thanks to the deepening of the relations 
of interdependence between all countries of 
the world, centre-periphery relations tend to 
present themselves in terms which make it pos-
sible to supplement that transfer of resources, 
on which the attention of the Third World has 
been concentrated up to now, by an effort to 
identify areas of common interests that may 
serve as a basis for reciprocally advantageous 
action, in which confrontation gives ground to 
negotiation. 
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This process, which of course is not The evolution of centre-periphery rela-
exempt from conflicts and which will entail tions just outlined is due to the changes that 
prickly negotiations, presupposes the introduc- have taken place in the two segments of the 
tion of more or less radical reforms in the world system, mainly in the course of the past fifteen 
economy, whose present structure is biased in years. 
favour of the industrialized countries. 
II 
Structural changes in the centres 
It has already been noted that during recent 
decades the international system has been cha-
racterized by the strengthening of transna-
tional relations at all levels. This phenomenon 
is largely due to the fact that the internationa-
lization of trade was followed by the interna-
tionalization of the production cycle. Among 
the principal agents of this process were, 
unquestionably, the transnational corpora-
tions, which expanded rapidly during the pe-
riod referred to, and whose growth was stimu-
lated by the tendency towards vertical or 
horizontal conglomeration of productive acti-
vities under a single firm, i.e., through control 
ei ther of the activities forming the entire chain 
of the production cycle or of activities distri-
buted over a wide range of branches of indus-
try. By the end of the 1960s the value of the 
output of the subsidiaries of transnational 
corporations located in the OECD countries 
already exceeded the value represented by 
those countries' foreign trade. Between 1955 
and 1970 the 500 biggest industrial firms in the 
world, according to the periodical Fortune, 
raised their share in the total profits of indus-
trial activities from 40% to over 70%. The share 
of United States firms located abroad in the 
overall gains of that country's enterprises 
soared from 7% in 1960 to about 30% in the 
mid-1970s, during which period the percen-
tage of the United States' global investment 
represented by its investment abroad increa-
sed in similar proportions (Barnetand Miiller, 
1974, and Müller, 1977-1978). 
Such was the process of formation of a 
transnational system based on connecting 
streams which often overflow the classic chan-
nels of the national States. This system was 
grounded on a sort of transnational community 
motivated by a set of similar values, objectives, 
professional skills, consumption patterns, 
status symbols and ways of life. The process is 
finally being completed by the appearance on 
the international scene of an increasing num-
ber of protagonists, currents of opinion and 
centres of influence which operate across na-
tional frontiers. The most obvious result is the 
deepening of relations of interdependence 
among all the peoples of the world, a pheno-
menon of which the scope will be briefly in-
dicated at a latest stage. In reality, the develop-
ment of each individual country is becoming 
more and more dependent upon the resources, 
markets, attitudes, policies, systems of life and 
cultural values prevailing in other societies, 
and its styles of development are increasingly 
determined by the dominant trends in the 
transnational system as a whole (Sunkel and 
Tomassini, 1980). 
It is this system which —as was said be-
fore— in the opinion of many observers of the 
contemporary situation is showing signs of 
crisis, at least if we grant the ambivalence that 
characterizes every crisis, according to José 
Medina Echavarria's felicitous and well-
known definition of this concept as a state of 
transition... which does not exclude either the 
system's strengthening and recovery or its final 
breakdown and min. 
It has also been stated already that the past 
decade witnessed an ever-deepening aware-
ness of the fact that economic growth has its 
iimits. This prise de conscience was stimulated 
by the recessive and inflationary tendencies 
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that were observable in the centres, and were 
Jinked to the rise in production costs and the 
loss of competitive capacity on the part of their 
production apparatus, in an increasingly large 
number of sectors. The resurgence and the 
high degree of fluidity and interconnexion of 
the international financial markets, subject to 
regulation by no authority whatever, helped to 
accelerate the international propagation of eco-
nomic disorders. The uncertainty reigning 
about supplies and prices in the field of energy 
—as well as in that of key industrial inputs— 
did much to aggravate a situation of internatio-
nal instability which is strengthening the 
recessive and inflationary trends noted above. 
According to a recent UNCTAD report, 
prepared on the basis of consultations held at 
various levels, the international economy will 
cont inue to hold out gloomy prospects. After a 
feeble and incomplete recovery from the se-
vere recession of 1974-1975, in 1979 the world 
economy entered upon a new phase of decline 
which presumably will be intensified in 1980, 
with some hopes of a dubious revival by 1981. 
According to the aforesaid report, the growth 
rate of the O E C D countries will be only 1.1% in 
1980 and perhaps 2,7% in 1981, instead of 3.3% 
as in 1979; that of the socialist countries will not 
exceed 4% in 1980-1981, and the developing 
countries will find it difficult to raise theirs 
above 5% per annum over the same period 
(UNCTAD, 1980). 
This state of stagnation, and the different 
forms it takes in the developed and in the de-
veloping countries, corroborate that trend 
towards the dispersion of world economic 
power to which allusion has already been 
made: a trend which has been reflected, firstly, 
in the weakening of the relative position of the 
United States as against Japan and the Euro-
pean Economic Community, and, secondly, in 
increasing competitiveness on the part of the 
relatively more advanced developing countries 
vis-à-vis the industrialized countries. 
Factors of three kinds, essentially, are 
pushing in this direction from within the de-
veloped societies: the appearance of a number 
of bottlenecks on the supply side; the emer-
gence of a series of structural rigidities in their 
respective economic, political and social sys-
tems; and the transformation of the values and 
demands prevailing in the societies in 
question. 
A great deal of speculation about the first of 
the above-mentioned factors has found expres-
sion in a copious literature, to part of which 
reference has already been made. Within this 
literature, special attention should be drawn 
here to the latest and considerably updated 
works of Walt W. Rostow (1978 and 1979). Ac-
cording to his analysis, the world economy 
would seem to be entering upon a fifth upsurge 
of the Kondratieff'wave',8 characterized by the 
emergence of an imbalance between the requi-
rements of economic expansion, on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, the supply of 
foods, raw materials and inputs available to 
sustain the expansion process, as well as by a 
correlative rise in the prices of these. The first 
such 'wave' or cycle apparently occurred at the 
close of the eighteenth century, having been 
brought about by the breakdown of the equa-
tion between population and food supply 
which followed the French Revolution and the 
Napoleonic wars, and which gave rise to the 
pessimistic prophecies of Malthus and Ricardo. 
T h e second of the cycles in question would 
seem to have centred upon the future of the 
United Kingdom's coal reserves, in the mid-
nineteenth century, and prompted the admoni-
tions by which Jevons sought to advocate a 
reduction of the growth rate both in his own 
country and on the continent. Prior to the 
Second World War similar challenges once 
again arose, represented, according to Keynes' 
classic analysis, by the tendency for a given 
unit of manufactured goods to allow the pur-
chase of a steadily declining amount of raw 
materials every year, and for comparative 
advantages in international trade to turn 
against the industrialized countries. A fourth 
cycle, with similar features, characterized the 
period following the Second World War. The 
evolution of the international economy as from 
the 1960s would seem to signify the appear-
ance of the fifth of these cycles. 
H
 According to the writings of the Russian economist 
N.B. Kondratieff, who suggested in the 1920s that the capi-
talist economies were subject to long cycles or "waves", 
lasting some 40 to 50 years, that were characterized by the 
appearance of limitations on the .supply side. 
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"In the coming years, as in other periods 
when primary commodity prices were re-
latively high, the leading sectors will be 
found in fields connected with natural re-
sources: generation and conservation of 
energy, expansion and conservation of raw 
materials, development and conservation 
of water reserves, agriculture (notably in 
developing regions), transport, pollution 
control, and research and development 
along a broad front primarily related to 
natural resources. To promote the growth 
of the investment required in these sectors 
considerable changes will have to be in-
troduced in public policies, in order both 
to create scenarios in which private invest-
ment can increase appropriately, and to 
generate the necessary public investment 
funds wherever the private sector cannot 
do the work". (Rostow, 1979, p. 40.)* 
The emergence of these bottlenecks on the 
supply side would seem to constitute, firstly, 
the natural price of a long period of expansion 
and prosperity for the industrialized econo-
mies, and has given rise, secondly, to the 
familiar debate on the limits of growth to which 
several allusions have already been made. 
The second group of factors determining 
the interruption and crisis of the expansion 
process of the contemporary transnational 
economy, and operating within the industrial 
societies, consists of a number of structural 
rigidities which have been gradually incor-
porated into these societies as a result of the 
behaviour of their economic, socio-political 
and environmental variables, and also as a 
sequel to the system's prolonged boom period. 
A no less abundant literature —of which an 
example deserving special mention is a recent 
study on the future development of the indus-
trially advanced societies in harmony with that 
of the developing countries, promoted by 
O E C D (1979)— records the appearance of 
these rigidities. Some of them are worth sin-
gling out for comment. 
Among the maeroeconomic limitations 
that have emerged during the period attention 
* Unofficial translation. 
has been drawn, in the first place, to the invest-
ment shortage originating in the decline of the 
rates of return on capital in most of the devel-
oped countries, in the increasing uncertainty 
and the risks deriving from economic, political 
and social circumstances, and in the growing 
amount of idle capacity in consequence of the 
trends described. Secondly, there are the huge 
balance-of-payments deficits piled up by seve-
ral industrialized countries which play a 
predominant role in the system and which in 
order to reduce these deficits find themselves 
under pressure to limit their rates of growth. 
Thirdly, account must be taken of certain chan-
ges that have recently occurred in international 
trade patterns, such as the fall in the ratio 
between trade and the world product, changes 
in the relative share of the various countries 
and the increased sensitivity of international 
trade to national policies, in a dangerous 
neoprotectionist context. Last but not least, 
mention must be made of the chronic outbreak 
of inflation. 
Certain socio-political constraints on 
growth are also cited among these rigidities. 
Those stemming from the evolution of the 
labour force in the industrialized countries are 
none the less decisive for being contradictory: 
this evolution comprises not only its growth 
(which will probably turn into a shortage in the 
near future), but also the changes in the labour 
supply deriving from its greater skills, the 
alteration in the preferences of those looking 
for work, and the rigidities created by the 
protection that the trade-union organization or 
government policies accord to certain sectors 
- all of which is reflected in specific and pre-
sumably transitory forms of unemployment. 
Mention is also made of the so-called 'institu-
tional sclerosis' observable in the industria-
lized countries, and imputable to the oligo-
polistic character of groups of producers which 
in face of the weak capacity of consumers to join 
forces exercise their economic or political 
power to defer innovations or prevent changes 
in the allocation of resources that may threaten 
their positions. The same analysts indicate, 
among the sources of these rigidities, the 
increase in government intervention through 
the proliferation of regulatory measures, the 
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expansion of public expenditure or the growing 
State participation in industrial activities, a 
t endency aggravated by the progressive inca-
pacity of governments to co-ordinate their poli-
cies, which in turn results from their commit-
men t to an increasing number of social objec-
tives. 
The need to control or correct the impact of 
specific economic activities on the physical 
environment, deriving from pollution or from 
their pressure on natural resources, also 
implies additional costs, on which we will not 
dwell here for the reasons already noted. 
O n e last category of factors which is in-
fluencing the transformation and crisis of the 
contemporary transnational system relates to 
the radical change that is taking place in the 
values or social preferences of an increasing 
number of groups and sectors within the advan-
ced societies. From Bell's 'post-industrial 
society' (1973-1976) to the 'made-to-measure' 
society which according to Toffler is to follow 
the age of mass production (1980), with, en 
route, the attack on the gigantism of the 
industrial countries' economic and social sys-
tems launched by Schumacher under the 
slogan of'small is beautiful' (1973), a number of 
images are offered by social science in the 
northern countries to interpret their phase of 
transition and crisis. This metamorphosis of 
values of course involves changes in the pre-
vailing orientation of demand in the societies 
in question, including not only the demand 
determining the type of goods and services 
expected from the formal sector of their produc-
tion systems, but also that relating to the needs 
which are met through the informal sector of 
their economies, such as transport require-
ments for maintaining contact between rela-
tives in societies characterized by a dispersed 
family structure, or recreational facilities in 
communities that attach increasing importance 
to the use of leisure time and entertainment. 
There are also other forms of demand whose 
satisfaction depends upon certain non-eco-
nomic processes, such as the requirements of 
self-realization, community participation and 
spiritual fulfilment, which are likewise gaining 
in importance in industrial societies. 
O n e of the most original and enlightening 
aspects of the recent OECD study mentioned 
above is the way it throws into relief the pre-
ferences expressed by the various societal 
groups, in accordance with a classification 
which divides them into materialist and post-
materialist values. Among the former are, in-
cluded the preference for security and national 
defence, economic growth, price stability, the 
purchase of durable goods and the maintenan-
ce of law and order; and among the latter, 
appreciation of the embelishment of cities, 
protection of nature, the construction of a 
society in which "ideas count more than mon-
ey", a less impersonal community structure, 
and a keener sense of participation at the com-
munity, labour and political levels. From the 
survey referred to it appears that to the clea-
vages inherent in the distribution of income 
and power, characteristic of indutrial societies 
throughout the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, are now being added further splits bet-
ween the materialist and the post-materialist 
view of life, essentially in line with distinctions 
of sex, age and profession, and involving a num-
ber of social groups, still in a minority but parti-
cularly active, which express their preference 
for the second set of values. 
Nothing could be more obvious than the 
linkage existing between the change in the 
values prevailing in industrially advanced 
societies and the possibility of keeping up the 
rate and style of growth which these societies 
have known in the past. 
The three categories of factors noted above 
have sown seeds of crisis in the contemporary 
transnational system and have hampered it in 
incorporating the structural changes that it 
needs in order to adapt itself to new circum-
stances and to allow the great industrial coun-
tries to continue growing at the same rate as 
before, to preserve their styles of development 
and to maintain their internationally competi-
tive position. At all events, the necessity of 
structural adjustment policies has come to 
constitute the dominant concern in the contem-
porary international scenario. 
With respect to the structural nature of the 
changes required in the societies in question, 
and to continue quoting unsuspected sources 
of partiality in support of the method of analysis 
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adopted from the outset in CEPAL thinking on 
this subject, let us recall that in a study he was 
commissioned to write by the Council on For-
eign Relations, Lincoln Gordon states his 
central thesis to be "that these types of struc-
tural growth policies are already of major im-
portance in most national economies, are likely 
to grow even more important, and are increa-
singly involved in international .economic and 
political relations" (1979). We may thus pass on 
to draw certain conclusions on the basis of tes-
timonies whose intellectual source is closer to 
us. 
The first of these conclusions relates to the 
widening of the margin of autonomy that some 
developing countries might enjoy within the 
framework of the contemporary transnational 
system, in consequence of the elements of stag-
nation and crisis in the system. "From this 
angle, it must be pointed out that Latin Amer-
ica's potential autonomy vis-à-vis the external 
world has substantially increased in the last 
two or three quinquennia", is the conclusion 
reached in a study on the trilateral system and 
Latin America, which notes that among the 
causes of this situation are the dispersion of 
economic power in the world economy and 
" the considerable development and potential 
for capital accumulation and technological 
change achieved in much of the region" (Fe-
rrer, 1979, p. 102). 
T h e second is connected with a pheno-
menon to which attention has already been 
drawn, and which will be reverted to later, 
namely, the reduction of the industrial coun-
tries ' competitive superiority over the develop-
ing countries in a steadily increasing number of 
sectors. These are trends that are operating in 
favour of more or less radical changes in the 
former international division of labour, and are 
paving the way for a process of world-wide 
redistribution of economic activities, the scale 
of which in the next few years it would be 
difficult to conjecture. In this context it is of 
interest to quote the opinion of one of the Latin 
American members of the Brandt Commission: 
"what I have found most surprising is that the 
way in which Western Europe (and Japan too) 
looks at the world and its relations with the 
developing countries is based on the sensation 
that owing to competition from some of the 
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developing countries it is systematically losing 
industrial sectors in which it used to believe it 
reigned supreme. Thus, one hears the story of 
how the United Kingdom or some of the coun-
tries of Continental Europe, which had already 
resigned themselves to the dismantlement of 
their textile industry, are today having to admit 
that they are losing ground in competition with 
what they call the newly industrializing coun-
tries, or the more advanced of the developing 
countries, in entire sectors such as steelmaking 
or shipbuilding. They are finding themselves 
obliged to close down those activities, once 
again no longer for circumstantial reasons, but 
because the capacity to run them has been 
gradually transferred to some of the developing 
countries which can offer not only the incen-
tive of lower costs but also, more surprisingly, a 
more advanced technology... That is, what is 
now at issue is no longer the old question of the 
prospects of industrial competition based on 
low wages that used to be debated in the 1950s 
or 1960s, but a matter of competition based on 
the developing countries' use of more advan-
ced technologies and equipment" (Botero, 
1979). 
In the course of the same symposium at 
which these opinions were expressed,9 Helio 
Jaguaribe after describing the three alternative 
lines along which the world order might in his 
view evolve in the future, indicated that the 
most probable —although not the most to his 
liking— was that of "centric and omnicom-
prehensive culturalism". And he added that 
" the process of incorporation by acculturation 
(as in the classical world) is gradually opening 
out towards the periphery" ( 1979, p. 43). Here-
in lies the third and most general conclusion to 
which this reading of the trends observable in 
the industrial centres leads us. 
It is a conclusion that José Medina Echa-
varria had already reached in his latest writings 
when , after noting that "the beginning of the 
economic recession in the great industrial 
countries has gone hand in hand with the ini-
tiation of detente", he explored the prospects 
9
 Seminar on Latin America and the New International 
Economic Order, CPV and RIAL, Viña del Mar, 7-11 
January 1979. 
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for the Latin American countries' external re-
lations in that new scenario. For in his opinion, 
from the point of view of these countries, 
within " the more open horizon" that is glimp-
sed in this scenario, "there can be no doubtthat 
dé tente opens possibilities of new options 
which are no longer limited to the choice bet-
ween the two principal models". Which led 
him to conclude that, if the Latin American 
countries are incited by the new climate of 
international permissiveness to run their own 
more independent course, "the opportunities 
thus opened up for them could be just as pro-
mising as they might be unfavourable and ne-
gative", - a conclusion which will be adopted in 
the last section of the present notes (1976, pp. 
49 to 52, passim). 
I l l 
Change and differentiation in the countries of the periphery 
T h e remarkable rate of growth recorded by a 
steadily increasing number of developing 
countries during the past twentyfive years, and 
their progressive integration in the inter-
national economy, have brought about deep-
seated changes in their economic, political and 
social systems as well as in their relations with 
the industrialized countries. 
It has already been pointed out that in the 
early 1950s nobody pinned great hopes on the 
possibility that the development of the peri-
pheral countries might be induced by stimuli 
deriving from external markets, and might go 
hand in hand with their gradual integration into 
the world economy; in contrast, what was ad-
vocated was the adoption of import-substi-
tuting industrialization policies and of me-
chanisms designed to regulate the inter-
national commodity markets. 
During the initial phases of the industrial-
ization process, the aim of many developing 
countries, particularly in Latin America, was to 
substitute domestic production for imports of 
manufactures. Through import substitution 
they sought to increase the proportion of 
domestic consumption that was satisfied with 
local products. Among the immediate motives 
for adopting this strategy were the chronic ba-
lance-of-payments crises suffered by the de-
veloping countries because of their structural 
subjection to external bottlenecks; it also 
served the long-term political objectives pur-
sued by the national governments. In the first 
connexion, it was hoped that import substitu-
tion would enable the peripheral countries to 
reduce their disbursements in foreign currency 
and increase their autonomy; in the second, the 
strategy in question afforded the ruling élites a 
way of satisfying the pressure exerted by the 
social sectors whose bargaining power was in-
creasing in consequence of the development 
process itself, through a policy destined simul-
taneously to foster growth, income distribution 
and employment. 
This strategy essentially implied an effort 
to wrest the domestic market out of the hands of 
foreign producers. In so far as domestic 
demand warranted the creation of new indus-
tries that some day —and this consideration bas 
now become very important— might be able to 
compete with the displaced foreign producers, 
it was possible to justify the levels of protection 
applied, using the arguments adduced on be-
half of nascent industry in the past. Of course, 
in so far as this latter condition was not fulfilled, 
import substitution strategy was bound to come 
up against certain limits. In other words, either 
industry began to bring in the foreign exchange 
required for its subsequent development, or its 
growth rate was adjusted to the supply of ex-
ternal means of payment generated by primary 
production, to which in some cases the stra-
tegies concerned had assigned a second prio-
rity. In practice, all that happened as a general 
rule was that imports of consumer goods were 
superseded by imports of the capital goods and 
inputs required for the operation and expan-
sion of the new industrial sectors. 
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In the course of time, many countries re-
cognized that the propensity to use foreign 
exchange without generating it is not inherent 
in manufacturing activity, and one after another 
reached the conclusion that it was necessary to 
place less emphasis on protection and attach 
more importance to efficiency, competitive 
capacity and export promotion. With pene-
trating foresight, one of the authors who has 
most lucidly analysed this problem concludes 
an early paper of his as follows: 
"Policy makers are likely to increasingly 
recognize the conundrum and adopt export 
promoting policies. Such a change in policy 
will bring the trade restrictions of the indus-
trialized countries into the centre of the stage, 
and make trade, not aid, the fulcrum of inter-
national economic debate" {Schydlowsky, 
1974). 
Thus, as from the mid-1960s —and even 
earlier in the case of island State or city-States 
that had no other alternative— the first moves 
were made to try out, in different tempos and 
diverse forms, new strategies based on,the libe-
ralization of the domestic market and the 
opening-up of the peripheral economies to the 
outside world. 
Because of their theoretical background, 
their age or their lack of historical vision, many 
specialists have seen in this transition a contest 
be tween rival schools; today, however, vie-
wing it in the perspective that time affords, it 
will doubtless be possible to appreciate more 
clearly that in practice these phases were not 
then presented as alternatives, but rather as 
complementary processes. For many Third 
World countries, import substitution repre-
sented the only valid option a ta given moment 
in their history, taking into consideration 
the stage of development they were passing 
through and the existence of an unfavourable 
external conjuncture. It often served as a basis 
not only for their industrialization but also for 
the consolidation of their own national iden-
tities. Moreover, at the time not only was there 
not seen to be a necessary contradiction bet-
ween the internal and external markets, but the 
former frequently served as a springboard as-
sisting access to the latter. While it is true that 
changes took place in growth strategies and in 
the external relationship patterns of the de-
veloping countries during the period in ques-
tion, it is no less true, as has been wisely 
recalled in a recent high-level report, that these 
changes did not take place overnight. 
"They" (the developing countries) "can-
not accomplish these changes suddenly; but 
since the 1960s many developing countries 
have moved towards strategies to promote 
exports and to offset disadvantages due to the 
insulation of their domestic markets. A number 
of countries which have introduced export-
oriented policies have been able to exploit 
their comparative advantage in world markets. 
They include some Latin American countries 
with a fairly long history of national indepen-
dence , and some island and city state eco-
nomies which were from the outset obliged to 
rely on export demand. Once industrialization 
has taken root, it is not only in labour-intensive 
industries like clothing or leather products, but 
also in moderately capital-intensive industries 
like electronics, steel and shipbuilding, that 
they can become highly competitive in world 
markets" (Independent Commission on Inter-
national Development Issues, 1980, p. 174). 
In consequence of these strategies, as the 
same report records in broad outline, the share 
of manufactures in the total exports of develop-
ing countries (excluding petroleum) gradually 
cl imbed from 10% in 1955 to 20% ten years 
later, and about 40% in 1975. Obviously, this 
boom in exports reflects more complex trans-
formations undergone by economies which at-
tained intermediate stages of development. It 
is likewise true that it was concentrated in what 
was still a limited number of countries. This 
leads us to refer, although in general terms, to 
the increasing differentiation between the 
countries of the periphery that has been obser-
vable in recent years and to the situation of 
those of them whose development has reached 
an intermediate stage. 
The literature on the subject has prolifer-
ated in recent years. The report prepared by the 
World Bank in 1978, as the first in a series of 
annual reports on the evolution of the interna-
tional economy, may afford a useful, although 
controversial, point of departure for dealing 
with the topic (IBRD, 1978). 
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"The developing countries have grown 
impressively over the past 25 years : income per 
person has increased by almost 3% a year, with 
the annual growth rate accelerating from about 
2% in the 1950s to 3.4% in the 1960s. Con-
trasted with what little can be gleaned of the 
experience of these countries before 1950, this 
is a substantial improvement over the historical 
record. Moreover, it compares extremely fa-
vourably with the growth rates achieved by the 
now developed countries over the period of 
their industrialization." But the report goes on 
to show that there have been marked differ-
ences in the performance of individual devel-
oping countries over this period. "Growth rates 
have generally been lower in the low-income 
countries of Africa and Asia where the majority 
of the world's poor live. In countries account-
ing for half the population of the developing 
world, income per person has risen by less than 
2% a year." 
Stress must be laid, therefore, on the great 
heterogeneity displayed by the developing 
countries as regards the size of their econo-
mies, their income levels, their resource en-
dowment , their economic structure, their orga-
nizational patterns, their technical capacity and 
their linkages with the world economy. It is 
thus legitimate to distinguish at least between 
(a) the petroleum-exporting countries, (b) the 
least developed countries forming the so-cal-
led 'Fourth World' and (c) the countries that 
have reached intermediate stages in their de-
velopment process. 
T h e report of the World Bank adopts per 
capita income as the basic indicator for differ-
entiating between these last two categories of 
countries. It includes among the low-income 
countries those with an annual per capita in-
come of up to 250 dollars, regarding the rest as 
middle-income countries. Clear as it is, this 
indicator is manifestly insufficient to character-
ize countries in terms of their various stages of 
development . Such a criterion makes it possi-
b le to include in this last category countries 
like Bolivia, Egypt and Thailand, which are 
still predominantly rural and in which the bulk 
of the population still lives at subsistence le-
vels along with others like Venezuela, Singa-
pore and some of the countries of southern 
Europe, which have an average per capita in-
come of over 2 500 dollars. There are also wide 
disparities between the low-income countries: 
the World Bank itself subsequently drew a dis-
tinction in this group between mining econ-
omies and predominantly agricultural coun-
tries (IBRD, 1979). 
In other analyses account is taken not only 
of the level of per capita income but also of the 
percentage of total exports represented by ma-
nufactures, the per capita value of industrial 
exports and the proportion of such exports 
constituted by 'complex products'. Among 
's imple ' industrial products are usually in-
cluded textiles, clothing and footwear, as well 
as chemical products basically obtained by 
elementary processing of primary commodi-
ties; the other industrial goods are regarded as 
'complex'. 
A common denominator for all these coun-
tries is the fact that they all possess a growth 
potential considerably higher than that of the 
least developed countries, and, consequently, 
have greater opportunities of raising the level 
of living of the poor—oppotunities which are 
not exclusively concentrated in the rural sector. 
Another common feature is to be found in the 
high growth rate of their industrial exports dur-
ing the past fifteen years and their steadily in-
creasing access to international credit over the 
most recent period. Owing to these latter cir-
cumstances, their development depends much 
more closely upon international trade and 
world capital markets than does that of the 
poorer countries, and their economies are 
therefore much more sensitive to the trends 
observable in the industrialized countries. 
The fact is that during recent years some of 
the countries of Latin America, Asia and South-
ern and Eastern Europe have developed 
swiftly as producers of manufactures which are 
highly competitive in international markets. 
The phenomenon, sometimes described as 'the 
emergence of two or three Japans' in the field of 
trade, is acquiring more and more importance. 
The literature of the English-speaking world 
describes these as newly industrializing coun-
tries (NIC's). They are shown in the following 
table. 
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*Countries classified in this category by OECD. The re-
mainder appear in a study by the Foreign Office of the 
Government of the United Kingdom (1979). 
These rapidly industrializing countries are 
seen by the developed nations as increasingly 
serious competitors, not only in their own mar-
kets but also in those of third countries, to 
which circumstance must be added the loss of 
the markets of those same countries that are 
expanding their exports to the extent that at the 
same t ime they are applying import substitu-
tion policies. In fact, the proportion of the 
O E C D countries' imports coming from these 
rapidly industrializing countries rose from 
2.6% in 1963 to 8% in 1976, and is still in-
creasing fast. The recrudescence of protection-
ism in the developed countries is the conse-
quence of this process. 
It is true that the benefits deriving from the 
expansion of industrial exports are very un-
equally distributed in the periphery, owing to 
the disparities indicated, and that an unduly 
high proportion of them is absorbed by the 
countries at an intermediate stage of develop-
ment. It must be borne in mind, however, that 
development is a dynamic process, and that 
probably an increasing number of countries 
will be able to attain the conditions necessary 
for participation in it. In this sense the coun-
tries at intermediate stages of development 
would seem to be pointing to the road that other 
developing countries might follow in the fu-
ture. 
Obviously, too, the opportunities that the 
developing countries have been finding open 
to them in the field of industrialization and 
trade in manufactures might be restricted by 
the recrudescence of protectionism in the in-
dustrialized countries. But it is also possible 
that the 'protectionist curtain', which over the 
short term certainly does pose this threat, may 
ultimately prove only to be concealing forces 
which, when a longer time has gone by, may 
operate in favour of a more balanced interna-
tional division of labour. In this context we 
should like to resume our preliminary discus-
sion of the changes that may have come about 
in centre-periphery relations during the last 
fifteen years. 
IV 
The internationalization of the world economy and 
centre-periphery relations 
A query was raised at the beginning of the 
present article as to the current validity of some 
of the interpretational hypotheses on the prob-
able future course of centre-periphery rela-
tions, based on post-war experience; and 
among these —to take up the thread of the argu-
ment again— we will give priority to the postu-
late of an irreversible trend towards the delink-
ing of the peripheral countries from the inter-
national economy. It would seem to be a matter 
of investigating whether these countries 
evolved in the direction of intensification of the 
' inward-directed growth' at which many of 
them aimed, and which corresponded to the 
trend described, or whether as a result of the 
changes that have occurred during recent years 
in the two segments of the system an inverse 
tendency towards 'internationalization' of their 
economies has emerged. Aníbal Pinto has re-
cently made contributions of essential signif-
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icance to the discussion of this question 
(1979).10 Although the solidity of that study 
would justify our confining ourselves to com-
ment ing on the data it contains and the conclu-
sions at which it arrives, the phenomenon is so 
new and the concept so ambiguous that a few 
perplexities still subsist and impel one to con-
t inue thinking about the current international-
ization process of the peripheral countries —a 
process which may mean very different things 
according to whether it is conceived as a 're-
sumption of the march of history' on the part of 
the peripheral countries towards their incorpo-
ration in the international economy, or as the 
emergence of an as yet ill-defined relation of 
in terdependence among all the economies of 
the world. 
Whatever the significance of the process, 
and whether its consequences be beneficial or 
pernicious, there can be no doubt that, as is 
maintained in Part Three of the Economic Sur-
vey of Latin America 1978, "the process of in-
ternationalization of the world economy (and 
society) will continue", although "the possibil-
ity that the process will lose ground or fail to 
make headway" cannot be ruled out (CEPAL, 
1979 b, p . 557). At the same time, as regards the 
region, the CEPAL document on Latin Ameri-
ca and the New International Development 
Strategy states, with reference to the 1970s, that 
"dur ing the present decade there have been 
radical changes in the manner of Latin Ameri-
ca's integration in the world economy and the 
process of internationalization and association 
with industrial-market economy countries has 
been intensified" (CEPAL, 1979 b). The re-
marks of the Executive Secretary of CEPAL at 
the Commission's last session pointed in the 
same direction, and drew attention to the am-
bivalent character of the phenomenon. 
"The experience of recent years shows that 
Latin America has pursued a more open form of 
development , more closely linked with the in-
ternational economy. This is nothing new as we 
are all aware, for the influence of external fac-
tors has been a historical constant in the region 
l0For fuller treatment of this material, see CEPAL, 
Economic Survey of Latin America 1978, Part Three, enti-
tled "Latin America and the Internationalization of the 
World Economy: Significance and Options" (1979, b). 
and in the developing countries in general. 
What is new are the forms this phenomenon has 
acquired. To avoid misinterpretation, let us 
say, that we consider this evolution to be posi-
tive and necessary for the internal develop-
ment process in so far as it enables activities 
requir ing more wide-ranging markets to be 
projected outwards, and the way ultimately 
opened for another scheme of international di-
vision of labour. We must also recognize that 
not all the effects of this relationship with the 
international economy are positive, however. 
There are also risks to be identified, and an 
attempt must be made to lessen them" (Igle-
sias, 1979a). 
Reserving for the last section a brief review 
of the balance of risks and opportunities which 
this phenomenon involves, and of the alterna-
tives with which it confronts the developing 
countries as regards their external strategy, we 
should like to confine ourselves here to des-
cribing its characteristics. To that end we shall 
examine the way in which the process con-
cerned is reflected in the internationalization 
of trade, financing and the production cycle. 
Because we are dealing with a new phenome-
non, in the weighting of the available indica-
tors more importance has been attached to its 
dynamic and qualitative aspects, which do not 
merely reflect a state of affairs but indicate a 
trend. 
As Aníbal Pinto notes at the start, between 
1950 and 1965 the annual growth rate of the 
periphery's exports climbed to 7.6% (6.8% in 
the case of Latin America). This rate of increase 
is in striking contrast with that of primary ex-
ports during the most thriving phase of their 
growth, between 1871 and 1913, when they 
expanded at an annual rate of 3.5% (Ferrer, 
1976, p. 23). The expansion of the periphery's 
industrial exports during the last part of the 
above-mentioned period was particularly sig-
nificant. 
Between 1960 and 1965 these sales, at 
constant prices, increased at an annual rate of 
12.3%, that is, almost twice as fast as the total 
exports of the countries concerned. From I960 
onwards, the developed countries' imports of 
manufactures from the markets of the develop-
ing countries grew faster than their industrial 
imports from the rest of the world, and between 
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1970 and 1976 their imports of manufactures 
from that source increased at an annual rate of 
about 14%, that is, twice as rapidly as their total 
exports of industrial goods and four times faster 
than their own manufacturing output 
(UNCTAD 1978). The share of the developing 
countries in world industrial production, 
which had stood at about 7% for the preceding 
twenty years, rose to 9% between 1970 and 
1977. 
As has several times been noted, the de-
veloped countries, in consequence of the in-
creasing competition from the developing 
countries and the problems besetting their own 
economies, as from the past decade began to 
discard the liberal principles adopted at Bret-
ton Woods, which had permitted the exception-
al expansion of world trade and the rapid 
growth of the industrial economies during the 
post-war period. Although protectionism is 
nothing new, having reached a peak around the 
1930s with disastrous consequences for the in-
ternational economy and the peace of the 
world, in recent years its scale and characteris-
tics have altered. The latter include its system-
atic nature, its permanence and its selectivity, 
that is, its discriminatory application against 
products which are becoming highly competi-
tive, and among which are the principal indus-
trial goods that the developing countries are 
able to export. 
It is common knowledge that the tariff re-
ductions granted by the developed countries in 
the framework of multilateral trade negotia-
tions mainly benefit the advanced-technology 
products which are the objects of their own 
reciprocal trade, and higher tariffs are main-
tained for the manufactures which the develop-
ing countries are in a position to sell. This is 
superadded to the traditional grading of tariff 
duties according to the degree of processing 
undergone by the products that the developing 
countries export. At the same time, in the last 
few years, there has been a proliferation of non-
tariff restrictions, the impact of which is often 
more effective or more insidious than that of 
tariff barriers. They comprise, of course, quan-
titative restrictions which range from a ban on 
imports of specific products (meat, for instance, 
in the case of EEC), to the imposition of quotas 
(as on food and vegetables in E E C or on sugar 
and more recently steel in the United States). 
They also include the levying of compensatory 
duties on exports from developing countries 
which the industrialized countries consider to 
be 'subsidized': a type of measure that has been 
applied abusively during recent years, with 
particularly destructive effects from the stand-
point of the export promotion policies that 
the developing countries have been bringing 
into force at the cost of a great deal of time and 
effort. Then, too, there are the various types of 
trade restriction agreements, outstanding 
among which are the so-called market organi-
zation agreements signed by exporters and 
importers with the object of limiting trade in 
specific products (the most conspicuous case 
in point being the Multifibres Agreement), and 
the 'voluntary restrictions' that are agreed upon 
bilaterally between the exporter country and 
the importer country, at the dictates of the lat-
ter. 
As has already been remarked, from a dy-
namic and long-term viewpoint such as jt is 
desired to adopt here, what lies behind this 
protectionist curtain is the developed coun-
tries' tendency to lose competitive capacity in 
an increasing number of their branches of in-
dustry. 
This has led many to suggest that without 
detracting from the importance attached by the 
developing countries to the adoption of a gen-
eral system of preferences, the benefits these 
countries could obtain from greater liberaliza-
tion of international trade ought not to be mini-
mized either. One writer attributes the dubious 
atti tude of many developing countries to the 
Tokyo Round to their defence of the margins of 
preference established by the GSP. As in prac-
tice, the same author concludes, these have 
created rather than diverted trade, and have 
been applied in a very restrictive fashion, it 
would seem that the developing countries as a 
whole would derive greater benefit from a 
more generalized, permanent and non-discre-
tional reduction (Perry, 1979). 
All this foreshadows drastic changes in the 
former international division of labour. Sir Ar-
thur Lewis expects that by the mid-1980s more 
than half the exports of the developing coun-
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tries will consist of manufactures, and in this 
connexion holds that "the abolition of restric-
tions on manufactured imports is much more 
important than anything that can happen in the 
commodities area". In his view "the division of 
the world into developing countries that export 
agricultural products and import manufactures 
and developed countries that do the reverse is 
on the verge of ending" (Lewis, 1980, p. 37). 
The significance of this trend, limited as 
yet, is strengthened by occurrences in the field 
of international financing. The insufficiency of 
the developing countries' export earnings to 
meet their growing import requirements, 
among which, of course, petroleum holds an 
outstanding place, has to some extent been off-
set by the remarkable financial permissiveness 
prevailing in the world economy. The sound 
articles on this subject published in this Re-
view render a relatively meticulous recapitula-
tion of the trends in question superfluous (Mas-
sad, 1976; Devlin, 1978 and 1979; and Zahler, 
1980). 
It is common knowledge that these trends 
are related to the explosive growth of the exter-
nal debt of the developing countries, a phe-
nomenon which has been accompanied by a 
drastic change in its composition in favour of 
commitments contracted with private sources. 
Although all this has unleashed a pack of pre-
monitions as to the supposed limits that the 
process is likely to encounter, and the 'contin-
gent ' nature of such credits in comparison with 
the rigidly 'stable' character of those from pub-
lic sources which were relatively more impor-
tant in the past, the truth is that at least in the 
fog of the present international economic con-
juncture these limits cannot be discerned. 
This opinion is corroborated by the fact 
that the rapid growth of the peripheral coun-
tries ' external debt during recent years has 
served not only their needs but also the inter-
ests of the industrial centres themselves. The 
second half of the 1960s witnessed the recru-
descence of the international capital markets, 
in the forms of a thriving Eurocurrency market, 
which had not been long in existence before it 
showed unequivocal sings of interest in oper-
ating with the developing countries. The rapid 
increase in Eurocurrency deposits, the grow-
ing number of banks operating in those markets 
and the consequent intensification of competi-
tion among them pressured them into sectoral 
and geographical diversification of their loans 
so that they could better distribute their risks 
by looking for new customers, and made bor-
rowers eligible that formerly would not have 
been so. Later an additional factor supervened: 
the slow growth of credit demand in the indus-
trialized countries in a context of prolonged 
recession. Furthermore, any possible misgiv-
ings on the part of the developing countries 
with respect to private credits were tempered 
by the fact that these loans were extended on 
more liberal terms, as regards both the use of 
the funds and the degree to which the creditors 
intervened in the management of the borrower 
country's economy. In the last analysis, the de-
veloping countries, in resorting with apparent 
unconcern to external borrowing, merely opted 
for deferring the recessive effects deriving 
from the rise in the prices of petroleum and of 
the capital goods imported from the industrial 
countries, instead of applying orthodox pres-
criptions which would have meant the para-
lysation of their economic growth. 
According to a recent estimate, the exter-
nal debt of the non-petroleum-exporting de-
veloping countries will increase from 330 000 
million dollars at the end of 1979 to 440 000 
million by the close of 1981 (UNCTAD, 1980). 
With respect to the future, in addition to the 
foregoing considerations, it is useful to take 
into account once again the observations of Sir 
Arthur Lewis. 
"Superficially this is a most precarious si-
tuation, and there is even fear that the inability 
of such governments to repay their loans may 
bring down the whole international banking 
system. But why should they be called on to 
repay? A banker lends money to earn interest. 
So long as the interest is safe, there is no need to 
repay the principal. The loan can be rolled 
over. A customer who insists on repaying is just 
a nuisance who is putting the banker to the 
trouble of finding another customer... What we 
need is an adequate flow of long-term finance, 
of various kinds, through all conceivable chan-
nels, including a long-term capital market re-
opened to good borrowers, supplemented by 
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the multilateral and bilateral government 
agencies and by private foreign investment, on 
terms ranging from market rates to grants to the 
poorest countries" (op. cit., pp. 65-66).u 
In short, according to the same writer, "the 
developing countries will depend on foreign 
borrowing long after they have ceased to de-
p e n d on foreign enterprise". 
In the meanwhile, however, private in-
vestment continues to act as one of the most 
powerful factors of linkage between the indus-
trialized and the developing economies. Ac-
cording to CEPAL data, the annual growth rate 
of foreign investment was almost 12% between 
1967 and 1975, exceeding both that of the prod-
uct and that of world exports (CEPAL/CET, 
1979 (d)). The best way of appreciating its im-
pact in all its ramifications would be to concen-
trate on its leading agent, the transnational cor-
porations. Much has also been written on this 
subject (United Nations, 1978; CEPAL, 1979 a; 
and Kñakal, 1979). As happened in the case of 
trade, dur ing the period referred to the share of 
developing countries in world foreign invest-
ment decreased from 31% to 26%, while the 
investment in question veered from the prima-
ry sector to the manufacturing sector and its 
countries of origin were considerably diversi-
fied. Apart from the fact that this latter trend 
he lped to increase the developing countries' 
capacity for manoeuvre, it is worthwhile to 
dwell for a moment on some of the qualitative 
aspects of the behaviour of the transnational 
corporations in those countries, during the 
most recent period. 
The first of these aspects is the tendency to 
11
 It is interesting to compare these views with those of 
Walter Robichek, Head of IMF for the Western Hemisphe-
re. H e observes that as a general rule a nation's debt is not 
reduced. It is highly likely that an attempt to reduce it 
would cause economic upheavals. When the international 
bankers say they are prepared to issue loans to a developing 
country on a certain scale, this statement must be taken to 
mean that they intend to continue commensurately raising 
the ceiling of loans to the country, with no time limit. Only 
thus can the deficit on a country's balance-of-payments 
current account be supported and the problems of debt 
servicing be safely avoided. The worst possible course that 
the international private financing community could follow 
with a developing country is to alternate periods of over-
lending with periods in which no new loans are granted at 
all (1980, p. 16). 
' internalization' of foreign investment which 
emerges as it shifts from primary activities to 
manufacturing, with the well-known chain ef-
fects. As Aníbal Pinto has recalled, in the past 
the link of foreign investment with the peri-
pheral countries was a factor more of geograph-
ical than of economic significance; but in this 
picture a radical change has taken place in re-
cent times, enhancing what the same author 
has felicitously termed the 'co-optation capa-
city' of foreign enterprises as regards determin-
ing the behaviour of an increasing number of 
economic agents and social sectors in the reci-
pient countries —a circumstance which inten-
sifies the internationalization of their econom-
ies. The second feature is the growing partici-
pation of transnational corporations in the 
global exports of the recipient countries (espe-
cially exports of manufactures), after an inter-
regnum coinciding with the application by the 
developing countries of strategies based on im-
port substitution, a stage during which their 
production was geared essentially to a domes-
tic market. This is revealed by the fact that 
during the first half of the 1970s the transnatio-
nal corporations' exports of manufactures in-
creased at an annual rate of 23% (CEPAL, 1979 
c, p . 168). The third and most important feature 
consists in the inclination shown by the trans-
national corporations to internationalize pro-
duction of final goods, installing productive ac-
tivities in those locations that offer comparative 
advantages, or to internationalize the 'produc-
tion cycle', splitting up the corresponding pro-
cesses with a view to manufacturing the various 
components of the finished products in the 
most suitable locations. All this has generated a 
process of redeployment of productive activi-
ties which is arousing considerable attention, 
however fervid the controversy over its re-
sults,12 as has been well documented in recent 
12
 In connexion with the familiar view according to 
which these displacements would seem to be due exclusi-
vely to wage differences between the centre and the peri-
phery, and therefore would not help to raise income or 
increase the value added of the new lines of production in 
the recipient countries, it has been recalled that the growth 
of investment has been relatively greater in the centres 
{where the prevailing rates of pay are appreciably higher) 
and that investors tend to offer wages substantially above 
average in the periphery. This would appear to endorse the 
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years (Evers, 1977; Institute of Social Studies, 
1977; Miiller and Moore, 1978; Grunwald, 
1978; Mukherjee, 1979; and Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office, United Kingdom, 1979). 
By industrial redeployment is meant the 
transfer of an existing industry from one loca-
tion to another in response to market factors or 
to government intervention. It has already 
b e e n noted that as from the 1960s the participa-
tion of the developing countries in world in-
dustrialization began to increase and to take 
new forms which made it possible for them to 
absorb a steadily growing number of industrial 
activities formerly located in the developed 
countries, both in the United States and, to a 
more marked extent, in EEC (particularly the 
Federal Republic of Germany) and Japan. The 
branches in which this trend is strongest in-
clude not only traditional labour-intensive in-
dustries (such as textiles and clothing), but also 
heavy industries (steel-making, refineries, pe-
trochemicals and fertilizers), shipbuilding and 
the metal-trans forming industries and certain 
polluting activities, such as the chemical and 
pulp and paper industries. 
One of the factors that have done most to 
stimulate this process is a propensity to indus-
trial complementarity or subcontracting, by vir-
tue of which manufacturing firms in the devel-
oped countries share their production with 
subsidiaries or independent enterprises establ-
ished in the developing countries, where they 
can avail themselves of the local advantages in 
respect of wage levels, tax treatment, supplies 
of natural resources, less strict environmental 
regulations or direct granting of subsidies. In 
this way there has grown up a brisk interchange 
of parts and spares and a close complementarity 
between the production processes required for 
the manufacture of the corresponding final 
products, which constitutes one of the key fea-
tures of international trade at the present time. 
In practice, the transnational corporations vir-
tually command half the world's trade, much of 
which is carried on between subsidiaries of one 
and the same firm. 
V 
Change in the international relations of 
the developing countries 
1. Internationalization; openness or 
interdependence 
On the basis of the background data reviewed, 
a few very provisional conclusions may be 
drawn, with respect to the question we initially 
posed as to the manner and measure in which, 
as a result of the changes that have occurred in 
hypothesis that the motivations accounting for the dis-
placements is question are identifiable with a more com-
plex set of factors, in which the loss of certain comparative 
advantages by the centres and the acquisition of new ad-
vantages by the periphery are dynamically combined. 
"From the point of view of Marxist categories, it could be 
said that the extraction of the relative surplus value (condi-
t ioned by the differential growth rates of productivity and 
wages) has been more attractive than the extraction of the 
absolute surplus value created by the intensification of the 
efforts of workers and/or the compression of wages." 
(CEPAL, 1979(b).) 
the international scenario, centre-periphery re-
lations have altered their course. More precise-
ly, we wondered at the outset whether perhaps, 
even if the structural features characterizing 
these relations remain the same, the time has 
not come to revise certain interpretations based 
on past situations, the account of which we 
began with a mention of the trend towards the 
delinking of the peripheral economies from the 
world economy. 
It seems needless to recall that the same 
indicators may be the object of conflicting in-
terpretations. In the case with which we are 
concerned we should like to start by pointing 
out three kinds ól bias which support that in-
terpretation according to which the periphery, 
spurred by the cirsumstances reviewed above, 
would seem to have confined itself in the pre-
sent historical conjuncture to resuming —in a 
new guise and more precipitately— the course 
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upon which it had started in the nineteenth 
century towards the internationalization of its 
economies. The greater importance assigned to 
the static aspects of the magnitudes consi-
dered, as compared with the amount of atten-
tion paid to their dynamic elements —i.e., 
those that reveal an accelerated trend which 
warrants expectation of 'major changes' in a 
near future— is one of the biases mentioned; 
among its manifestations is the fact that more 
weight is attached to the decline in the peri-
phery 's total share in international trade than to 
the boom in its exports of manufactures, which 
is rapidly yoking it to that segment of demand 
in the centres which shows greater elasticity or 
dynamism. The emphasis placed on the bigger 
relative gains of the centres as against those of 
the periphery, rather than on the changes 
which much of the periphery has undergone 
dur ing recent decades in absolute terms, that 
is, in comparison with its behaviour in the past, 
produces the same effect; as happens, too, 
when the reduced share of the periphery in 
international investment is underscored with-
out sufficient stress being laid on the drastic 
changes that have taken place in connexion 
with the expansion, diversification and pene-
tration (or co-optation capacity) of new invest-
ment in the economies of a steadily growing 
number of developing countries. Lastly, the 
propensity to regard every 'novel' tendency as 
'exceptional ' , and therefore merely contingent, 
completes an approach which in every case 
tends to reach the disquieting—or intellectual-
ly soothing— conclusion that 'there is nothing 
new under the sun'. A case in point is the dis-
cussion on the probable interruption or conti-
nuity of the financial permissiveness which has 
made possible the remarkable change and in-
crease in the developing countries' external 
borrowing during recent years. 
Once we are on guard against these biases, 
the conclusion may be reaffirmed that the indi-
cators noted are the unequivocal expression of 
a closer interlacing of the developing countries 
—especially those which are relatively more 
advanced— with the international economy, 
and that the tendency towards delinking of the 
two segments of the system, which seemed to 
characterize centre-periphery relations during 
the post-war period, is being replaced by an 
increasing interdependence. In the case of our 
own region, the interpretative summary of a 
recent meeting organized by CEPAL recalls 
that one of the questions raised bore on the 
degree to which Latin America "has become 
integrated into the world economy not only 
through its trade patterns but also through ex-
panded investment, capital flows and interna-
tional debt",13 and the following answer was 
arrived at. 
"Increased diversification of the region's 
economic structure has led to a new kind of 
relationship with the world economy. 
Countries in Latin America have moved 
from dependence on a few primary prod-
ucts or agricultural commodities to a more 
macroeconomic interdependence that is 
more complex and interlaced with the 
world economic system. The combination 
of increased industrialization, the rise of 
the multinational corporation as a major 
presence in the region and the recycling of 
the O P E C surplus to Latin America in the 
form of increased debt have brought this 
region to a degree of integration into the 
world economy which is higher than in the 
past and also higher than that of other de-
veloping regions. This new macroecon-
omic interdependence poses problems as 
well as potentialities, but it is an important 
feature of the Latin America of today. This 
aspect of the new Latin America shows 
what a stake this region has in the fate of 
the world economy..." (Bradford, 1980, p. 
113). 
Let me say at once that the various inter-
pretations of this phenomenon and the actual 
opposition it arouses in many observers have 
their roots in a confusion which little has been 
done to clear up hitherto, and which is further 
aggravated by the ambiguity surrounding the 
concept of interdependence itself.14 This ad-
13
 "A new Latin America in the changing world econ-
omy", a meeting organized by CEPAL and the Latin Ame-
rican Programme of the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, at the Belmont Conference Center, 
near Washington, D.C., on 25 and 26 June 1979. 
1 4The studies on interdependence carried out in the 
centres during recent years —which, incidentally have 
been little assimilated in the countries of the periphery— 
have not succeeded in freeing this concept from the ambi-
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vanee towards interdependence (as against 
delinking) between the peripheral economies 
and the central economies is in fact synony-
mous or consubstantial with the experiments in 
'external openness ' conducted by some of the 
developing countries at different times and in 
different circumstances, as options allegedly 
counter to the 'inward-directed growth' strate-
gies: experiments which in recent years have 
been protagonized by an increasing number of 
Latin American countries, and have repre-
sented various combinations of pragmatism 
and orthodoxy. Does the fact of recognizing 
that the prevailing post-war trend towards de-
linking of the peripheral countries from the 
industrial centres is changing, and giving way 
to fuller integration of the developing countries 
in the world economy, mean repudiating 'in-
ward-directed growth' and unconditionally 
embracing openness-oriented strategies based 
on 'outward-directed' growth? Here we can 
only sketch a conclusion. Two different planes 
are involved. After more than a decade of anal-
ysis and discussion on these subjects, it is pos-
guity in question (in this connexion, see principally Rosen-
crace and Cooper, 1968 and 1972; Rosencrace and Stein, 
1976; Nye, 1976; and Keohane and Nye, 1977). But the 
phenomenon exists, and had already been noted by the 
powerful intuition of José Medina Eehavarria, when, refer-
ring to "an ever-recurring theme in recent years", he postu-
lated " the possibility that some time the present theme of 
dependence will become out of date because of the slow or 
rapid modification of its nature as a form of unilateral he-
gemonic dependence" , and suggested that, intellectually 
at least, it would be possible to think about "another form of 
this dependence as a plurilateral relationship" (op. cit., pp. 
59-60). Outlining a description prepared for other purposes 
on the basis of the bibliography indicated, interdepen-
dence might be defined as the increased sensitiveness re-
ciprocally shown by given national societies to events or 
t rends occurring in others, a phenomenon which when 
carried to extremes might result in an undesirable state of 
external vulnerability. Its evolution would depend on 
three conditions, inter alia: (a) the greater degree of diffu-
sion or of internalization of the external linkages of a given 
society; (b) the construction of a multiple agenda, with 
relatively little ranking, of topics whose treatment depends 
upon the society's external relations; and (c) the develop-
ment of a number of channels for the management of those 
relations. Within this same frame of reference, among the 
effects of interdependence upon the developing countries' 
international relations mention may be made of the diversi-
fication-(geographical and topical) of their external rela-
tions, the widening of their margin for international mano-
euvre, and the strengthening of the elements of change in 
the traditional pattern of their international relations, 
sible to forecast that, in a considerably changed 
scenario, some of the peripheral countries will 
press on -towards development along the same 
lines as in the past: towards development with 
' inward-directed' growth, based on industrial-
ization, on making the most of their domestic-
resources, on the expansion of their national 
markets and on reciprocal economic co-opera-
tion. But to borrow another of Aníbal Pinto's 
felicitous metaphors —paraphrasing Von 
Clausewitz' well-known saying that "war is no-
thing but a continuation of political intercourse 
with the admixture of different means"—, what 
is involved here is a continuation of the march 
of history towards the development and indus-
trialization of the peripheral countries along 
paths more appropriate to the new scenario: 
paths among which the changing forms of their 
external relations hold an oustanding place.1S 
In other words, it is our opinion that the 
objective features of the international scenario 
today have a bearing on the external strategy 
that the developing countries ought to adopt, 
relatively irrespective of whether they have 
opted for an 'openness-oriented' model, in 
which exports serve as the 'engine' of devel-
opment, or have continued in the direction of 
' inward-directed growth', using exports as the 
' lubricant ' of this development, according to 
another of the metaphors coined by Lewis 
(1980), or have tried out some sort of combina-
tion of the two models, depending upon their 
ideology and the characteristics of their econ-
omy.16 Here we will hazard the hypothesis that 
15AS was noted at the outset, we have kept out of the 
discussion on alternative policies of 'in ward-directed 
growth' and 'outward-directed growth', rich and lively as it 
is (see especially in this connexion Assael, 1979), in order to 
concentrate on the options before the developing countries 
today with respect to the formulation of their external strat-
egies. A lucid analysis of the changing external conditions 
in which the developmet of the peripheral countries is 
taking place, accompanied by a proposal directed towards 
the creation of an "endogenous nucleus of technological 
dynamtzation" on the internal front, is contained in an 
unpublished study by Fajnzylber ( 1980), which the present 
author had an opportunity of reading only after he had 
finished writing this article. 
lf iIt must not be forgotten that however much weight is 
carried by ideological considerations in the choice bet-
ween these options, the circumstances, the degree and the 
particular forms in which an individual country inclines 
towards one or the orther depend substantially upon its 
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whatever the line chosen by a developing 
country within this spectrum, it will have to be 
pursued in an external setting characterized by 
an increasing interrelationship with the inter-
national economy, very different from the si-
tuation prevailing after the war. And we also 
venture to assume that to some extent and in 
different ways the external setting in question 
will impel the peripheral countries to attempt a 
greater degree of openness than in the past. 
And here a second distinction is required, for 
this greater degree of external openness must 
no longer be deemed synonymous with a poli-
cy firmly based on economic liberalism; in 
practice it can coexist with different forms of 
State intervention and economic development 
planning. In short, there would not appear to be 
a rigid correlation between certain degrees of 
State intervention in the economic process, in-
ward-directed growth and delinking from the 
world economy, just as at the other extreme 
nei ther should there be such a correlation bet-
ween economic liberalism, external openness 
and interdependence on the plane of interna-
tional and economic relations. In any event, 
this last phenomenon is a key feature of the 
external panorama today, and as such should be 
taken for granted. It would therefore seem pos-
sible in some specific cases to combine various 
forms of State intervention and external open-
ness, so as to regulate the participation of na-
tional economies in an international economic 
system characterized by increasing interde-
pendence.1 7 
Oí course, if a country adopts an exagger-
ated model of external openness, on the basis of 
a falsely optimistic appraisal of the possibilities 
deriving from the aforesaid increasing inter-
linkage of the world economy and from the role 
of the external market as an engine of growth, it 
may jeopardize its long-term development 
prospects. But it is also true that a country 
which pursued a more balanced strategy,based 
characteristics, particularly as regards the size and struc-
ture of its economy and the traditional pattern of'its linkage 
with the outside world. 
17As is suggested in the last part oí the study by 0 
Sunkel and L. Tomassini to which allusion has several 
t imes been made. 
on a better equilibrium between the use of the 
internal and external markets and on selective 
import substitution in some sectors accom-
panied by policies of openness and export pro-
motion in others, might throw away many op-
portunities in so far as, together with other pe-
ripheral countries, it were to persist in applying 
external insertion strategies based on an out-
dated conception of the international economy 
and of its principal trends, and did not learn to 
turn to the best possible account the balance of 
risks and opportunities offered by the external 
scenario today. 
2. Integration of the developing countries in 
the international economy: some options 
The foregoing remarks lead us to refer to 
the main options which in one way or another 
have inspired the various strategies that they 
have tried out successively or concurrently in 
their negotiation with the industrialized coun-
tries —a subject which we have several times 
discussed elsewhere.18 One of the factors most 
responsible for the failure of international eco-
nomic negotiations to achieve more than very 
modest results lies in the conceptual confusion 
which seems to prevail in the corresponding 
debate. The greater the proliferation of confer-
ences, forums and proposals designed to pro-
mote the establishment of a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO), the more clearly evi-
dent it becomes that in this field there reigns "a 
great disorder under the heavens". From va-
rious standpoints specific proposals are formu-
lated which may be considered as optative, 
contradictory or merely unrelated, as the case 
may be . In contrast, no sufficiently explicit ac-
count has been given of the major world eco-
nomic order models which lie behind the va-
rious 'packages' of measures. Basically, the fol-
lowing are the models concerned: 
(a) The segregation or delinking of devel-
oping countries from the international capital-
ist system, and their adherence to strategies 
based on individual and collective self-reli-
ance: a proposal which seems to be diametric-
ally opposed to the current trends of the inter-
net» L. Tomassini, 1977,1978 and 1979 a. 
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national system, and which has been confined 
to the realm of ideas, no moderately lasting and 
successful experiments in this direction having 
been recorded, except in the case —in many 
respects unique (and apparently undergoing 
change)—of China;19 
(b) Indiscriminate incorporation of the 
Third World countries in the former system of 
the international division of labour, relatively 
updated: a course which would seriously com-
promise their long-term development poten-
tial, and would involve the intensification of 
their ties of dependence with the industrial 
countries and the gradual loss of their autono-
my, with the ensuing sequel of frustration and 
revolutionary reactions; 
(c) T h e establishment of a sort of "global 
social-democracy", based on the regulation of 
international markets or on their replacement 
by more centralized mechanisms, along the 
l ines laid down in the Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action for the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order (NIEO): a 
programme which would probably necessitate 
the installation of a sort of world authority 
and/or a substantial increase in the bargaining 
power of the Third World. 
These strategies approximately corre-
spond to the alternative which in terms of the 
concepts of 'exit', 'voice' and 'loyalty' Hirsch-
man proposed some time ago from a broader 
point of view, in order to analyse the operation 
of social systems. Within these alternatives, the 
measures propounded in the framework of 
N I E O approach the option of protest ('voice'), 
'^Setting aside the circumstance that because of its 
characteristics and historical background China was in a 
un ique position to undertake an experimentof this type, in-
formation in recent years suggests that this great country 
would seem to be overhauling its traditional policy of isola-
tion and self-centred development. Little is known of other 
incomplete and minor examples, such as those afforded by 
Albania and Cambodia, and as far as the available informa-
tion goes, they have been definitely regressive. Lastly, 
other countries too are reviewing their traditional self-cen-
tred development policy, as is revealed by the note on 
Cuba in the Economic Survey of Latin America 1978 
(CEPAL, 1979). On the conceptual level, there have been 
few articulate formulations of this position, save for such 
exceptions as the early writings of ul Haq (1970 and 1976) 
and the works of Emmanuel (1969) and Amin (1970 and 
1973). 
reflected in their spirit of confrontation and in 
their far-reaching programme of reforms. 
To revert in passing to opinions formulated 
on other occasions, this last programme would 
seem to be inspired by a mixture of pessimism 
and mistrust vis-à-vis the prospects of progres-
sive integration of the developing countries in 
the international economy, an attitude which 
gradually led to the proposal of a number of 
'concessional ' or 'preferential' measures, de-
signed to promote a unilateral transfer of re-
sources from the developed to the developing 
countries, by means of mechanisms parallel or 
alternative to those of the market. Thus the 
Third World has thrown all its weight into sup-
porting the integrated basic products program-
me —which substantially represents a mechan-
ism designed to stabilize the improvement in 
commodity prices— instead of negotiating 
broader arrangements that would enable it gra-
dually to acquire a greater share in the process-
ing and marketing ofsuch products, by virtue of 
the industrialized countries' manifest interest 
in promoting the development of natural re-
sources, in view of prospective shortages. It has 
p inned high hopes on the general system of 
preferences and very few on the benefits that 
could be obtained through fuller liberalization 
of trade at the world level. It continued to urge 
the necessity of more official aid for develop-
ment on better terms, even long after it had 
already become obvious that the industrialized 
countries were unwilling to meet the minimum 
targets set by the international community in 
that respect; and this despite the thriving re-
surgence of the private capital markets and its 
increasing access to these, a situation which 
has deferred systematic consideration of the 
most appropriate means of making that access 
more stable and more efficacious. Is has per-
sisted in placing emphasis on the need to adopt 
an international code to regulate the transfer of 
technology, instead of devoting more attention 
to improving its capacity to bargain with ex-
ternal suppliers and to assimilate and adapt the 
technology in question, in which field very 
valuable experiments had been carried out. It 
has also striven to promote the adoption of a 
code of conduct to regulate the behaviour of 
transnational corporations, but has shown less 
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interest in analysing the experience of those 
countries which in recent years have been 
trying out new and more advantageous contrac-
tual arrangements with those enterprises. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the in-
sufficient integration of the peripheral coun-
tries in the international economy has consti-
tuted, in many cases, a sort of 'self-fulfilled 
prophecy' . At the present stage it seems need-
less to stress that in this as in other respects 
great differences are observable in accordance 
with the level of development of the various 
countries —a topic to which we have already 
referred in Part Three of the present article. 
This reminder having been given, it is worth-
while to underline the fact that Latin America 
has displayed a good deal of imagination in 
trying out new forms of linkage with the inter-
national system, although on many occasions 
and for diverse reasons it has not allowed these 
experiments to influence the adoption of the 
positions it advocated on a more official or more 
rhetorical plane. In this connexion, a recent 
meet ing at which these questions were dis-
cussed, and to which allusion has already been 
made, reached the following conclusions:20 
"Latin America aspires to a type of devel-
opment fully integrated with the interna-
tional economy. We believe that in general 
the countries of the region do not support 
those options which might favour a path of 
'separate development' . This strategy 
seems historically alien to the options 
which in practice most of the Latin Ameri-
can countries have already adopted. That 
does not mean that there is only one way 
for the countries of the region to achieve 
integration in the international economy. 
There are numbers of paths to that goal. 
These paths will depend upon each indi-
vidual country's size, economic structure, 
political orientations and traditional ex-
ternal linkages. But we also believe that 
this plurality of paths does not rule out the 
possibility of concerting external'policies 
to an increasing extent, and that the coun-
tries of the region will be in a better posi-
a
"I.e. , the above-mentioned seminaron Latin America 
and the New International Economic Order (Viña del Mar, 
7-11 January 1979). 
tion to negotiate with the industrial centres 
if they take solidary action than if they 
choose to 'go it alone' " (quoted in Hill and 
Tomassini, op. cit., pp. 10 and 11). 
3. Towards a strategy of selective participation 
in the international system 
T h e conclusion which it is desired to suggest at 
the close of the present article is that the inte-
gration of the developing countries in the trans-
national economic system does not necessarily 
entail only negative effects. As has been poin-
ted out elsewhere, this is a process with a con-
siderable margin of ambiguity as regards its 
implications for the peripheral countries, since 
it involves a novel balance of risks and oppor-
tunities. At the same time, the type of conse-
quences that it generates for the peripheral 
countries does not depend solely upon the will 
or the interests of those countries that hold a 
central position in the system, since in face of it 
the peripheral countries can assume either an 
active or a passive role, to use the termino-
logy recently employed by Enrique Iglesias 
f 1979a). To avoid entering upon a new topic, let 
it once again be he that briefly presents this 
balance. 
"Our international position is positive in 
so far as it enables us to assimilate technology, 
expand abroad activities which require larger 
markets, and open the way to new forms of the 
international division of labour in which our 
countries occupy the place for which they are 
already fit. 
"But there are also risks in our new external 
position. These risks take shape in the limita-
tions which such links place on our develop-
ment, in the changing impact of the external 
cycle on the evolution of our economies and 
in the restrictive and protectionist policies 
employed by the industrialized countries as a 
way of protecting themselves against the reces-
sive and inflationary trends which have charac-
terized the world economy recently. 
"The existence of an open world economy 
and the establishment of an international divi-
sion of labour which is more in keeping with 
the capacities of each country, large or small, 
have become an increasingly important requi-
rement for the development of the Latin Ameri-
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can countries. We depend more and more on 
the operation of a world economy based on 
genuine interdependence" (Iglesias, 1980b). 
If this is so, the developing countries 
should not choose strategies which imply ei-
ther their passive subordination to the forces 
of the world economy or the replacement of 
international markets by more centralized 
mechanisms, but should seek new forms of 
'selective participation' in the system. It would 
appear that a strategy of this type would be 
more in keeping with current trends in the in-
ternational scene. Moreover, it would enable 
the developing countries to attain at one and 
the same time the threefold objective of avail-
ing themselves of the advantages deriving from 
their increasing integration in an international 
context of steadily growing interdependence, 
mitigating the undesirable effects of an un-
stable and unfavourable external cycle, and 
preserving or maximizing the autonomy of 
their national development processes.21 Con-
sidering how little attention has been paid to 
this alternative, it is interesting to remember 
that one of the first calls to such action came 
from Latin America. 
"The experience of Latin American 
demonstrates the need to abandon the idea that 
the essential stimulus to development comes 
from total integration in the international 
economic system. On the contrary, the in-
troduction of new styles of consumption and 
production, and likewise the attainment of a 
minimum level of autonomy, necessitate ad-
2
 A variant of this approach lies in an idea which has 
recently gained ground in international discussions, 
namely, that of founding centre-periphery relations on a 
strategy based on the identification of areas of common 
interest, and on the structuration of a global economy in 
which both groups of countries can obtain real benefits. 
Such was the approach adopted by the Brandt Commission 
in its proceedings. Its Report points to the need for "'posi-
tive mutual interests" to be identified. And it goes on to 
add: "We believe there are numerous such interests. But 
greater efforts are required to place them at the centre oí de-
bate. The North-South dialogue has suffered from the at-
mosphere which prevailed in the past oí Southern 'de-
mands ' and Northern 'concessions'; it is only in more recent 
years that prominent leaders of opinion have begun to call 
lor the dialogue to be regarded as an opportunity for part-
nership, one in which all sides can work for their mutual be-
nefit" (Independent Commission on International Devel-
oping Issues, 1980, p. 65). 
vancing towards policies of selective participa-
tion in the system, such as will make it possible 
to choose the type of linkage desired. It is a 
question of minimizing dependence, of maxi-
mizing autonomy and ofseeking new models of 
self-reliant development" (Latin American 
Forum, 1975). 
A strategy of'selective participation' in the 
system, such as that proposed above, should 
achieve an adequate combination of three 
types of action: (a) structural reforms designed 
to correct current defects in the international 
markets; (b) long-term agreements between 
the central and the peripheral countries which, 
supplementing the action of market forces, will 
promote a redeployment of certain economic 
activities and a pattern of trade that will en-
courage the development of those productive 
activities for which some of the developing 
countries have been fitting themselves in 
recent times; and (c) concessional programmes 
aimed at palliating some of the more obvious 
disadvantages that are affecting the peripheral 
countries, especially those that are in the initial 
stages of their development process. 
Selective participation of the developing 
countries in the international economic system 
of course presupposes the introduction of more 
or less radical structural reforms in the world 
economy as it works today. So one would have 
to speak of'participation with restructuration'. 
To that end it is necessary that the central 
countries give up protecting their primary acti-
vities as they have been doing hitherto; that 
they countenance more extensive local devel-
opment and processing of the peripheral coun-
tries' natural resources; that they make it 
possible for the developing countries to build 
up industrial activities capable of generating 
higher value added, a greater capacity for 
technological innovation and a more vigorous 
overall activation of their economies. 
The industrialized countries will have to 
apply whatever adjustment policies may be 
necessary to permit the operation of those for-
ces which today are making for a more rational 
rearrangement of the former international divi-
sion of labour. The costs of such policies do not 
seem to be excessive in absolute terms, and in 
any event would represent only a small fraction 
of the costs incurred on account of the changes 
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in the allocation of resources, the displacement 
of productive activities, industrial redeploy-
ment and the adaption of manpower which are 
occurring as a result of specialization, compe-
tition and technological change within the in-
dustrialized countries themselves, as well as of 
their competition with one another. 
At bottom, it is a question of the central 
countries ' putting into practice the principles 
they have long maintained in the economic 
field. These countries should not consider the 
above-mentioned adjustments policies as an 
extra burden assumed for the benefit of the 
developing countries, but as a normal part of 
their industrial modernization processes, 
which in any event they will have to tackle if 
they do not want to condemn their production 
apparatus to a state of backwardness and lose 
their capacity to compete in the industrial field 
with their own advanced capitalist associates, 
and even, gradually, with their new rivals in 
the South. 
The developing countries, on their side, 
should gradually abandon a strategy of nego-
tiation with the developed countries based on a 
' shopping list' of claims deriving from the more 
or less exhaustive but unduly reiterated analy-
sis of their injuries or grievances (a strategy 
which, hitherto pursued with little regard for 
the viability of such claims, has produced only 
meagre results), and replace it by a strategy of 
more selective bargaining. This new strategy 
should not cease to urge the necessity of con-
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Comments on Peripheral Capitalism and 
its Transformation* 
Comments by Lucio Getter 
1. It is necessary to state from the outset a fun-
damental coincidence of opinion with Pre-
bisch's article on "Socio-economic structure 
and crisis of peripheral capitalism", if the se-
lection of the critical points chosen by the com-
mentator and the content of his remarks are to 
be intelligible. This area of coincidence can be 
broken down into two propositions: firstly, that 
the crisis of the system in the Latin American 
countries is a structural crisis, a theoretical 
understanding of which calls for analysis of the 
specific forms of capital accumulation, and of 
the social and political conflicts linked with 
these; and, secondly, that the analysis of the 
dynamic operation of the structure in question 
must begin with the internal factors. I under-
stand, and accordingly agree, that this is a mat-
ter of the priority of internal over external fac-
tors at the start of the analysis, although the 
latter must not be left out of count. This second 
point is of great interest for the commentator, 
because it allows him also to invoke theauthor-
ity of the article under consideration in discus-
sions of a more punctual character; thus, for 
example, some time ago certain Argentinian 
economists, seeking to account for the military 
coup of 1976, gave a foremost place in their 
explanation to references to the new trends in 
the international division of labour (external 
factors) which would seem to be determining 
the resolution of internal conflicts. I note in 
passing that this ranking of the explanatory fac-
tors is, in that respect, akin to theoretical analy-
ses such as those of Gramcsi (see Note sal Mac-
chiarelli - Sulla Política e sullo Stato Moder-
no), in which, in a few pages, he expounds a 
methodological proposal for the study of politi-
*These comments on the recent articles by Raúl Pre-
bisch published in this Review —"Socio-economic struc-
ture and crisis of peripheral capitalism" (No. 6), "The neo-
classical theories of economic liberalism" (No. 7), and 
"Towards a theory oí change" (No. 10)— are some of tiiose 
that were formulated at a special seminar organized by the 
Centro d e Capacitación para el Desarrollo (CECADE, Me-
xico) at the end of 1979. The rest of the comments will be 
publ ished in forthcoming issues. 
cal conjunctures in which for the purposes of 
analysis interna! factors acquire priority. 
One initial digression before concentra-
t ing on the points selected for these comments: 
in Prebisch's article there are two texts, one 
economic and one political. The fusing of the 
two is very salutary; the article thus regains the 
analytical perspective of classical economics. 
In following this path, however, some risks are 
run to which reference must be made and 
which, in my opinion, have not been altogether 
avoided. 
Thus, for example, Prebisch sets himself 
the following programme of work: to make "full 
knowledge of the system that is to be trans-
formed" and "precise awareness of where its 
great defects l ie" the first step towards a subse-
quen t "theory of change". However, the fact 
that the article begins with the structural diag-
nosis and then goes on to political consider-
ations does not mean that in the overall process 
of theoretical reflection some politico-ideolo-
gical a prioris have not been accepted. The 
exposition of his line of thought would seem to 
differ in order from its elaboration. This is a 
question which is admittedly difficult to re-
solve, but it must be tackled because of the risk 
that political preconceptions may be doing vio-
lence to certain economic categories, or pass-
ing over other aspects of the economic and so-
cial process, or attributing the wrong relative 
weight to certain analytical variables. 
A classical example illustrates the afore-
said risks. Ricardo's labour value theory and his 
theory of land rent provided grounds for elimi-
nating the tariff protection by which English 
farmers were benefiting. To that end, Ricardo 
established the theoretical principle —histori-
cally incorrect— that the expansion of agricul-
tural production would be accompanied by di-
minishing returns, and failed to take into ac-
count that there was also a part of land rent 
which derived from the technical progress in-
corporated into the economic units, and which 
for Marx constitutes differential rent II. 
Prebisch expresses very legitimate con-
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cern at the fact that processes of transition to 
more socialized patterns of production have 
sanctioned political inequalities and repres-
sive systems; although this has not always been 
the case. But it is one thing to devote theoreti-
cal consideration to the social inequalities that 
existed in the original socialist accumulation, 
as well as to the social and political dynamics 
that have permitted the crystallization of these 
inequalities, and quite another to criticize 
them in the light of Gritería pertaining to politi-
cal liberalism and western civilization, applied 
on the plane of ideology, and not in a context of 
specific social relations. Hence it is that many 
of his opinions are difficult to share in this re-
spect. 
2. T h e following is the argument advanced by 
Prebisch on which I am proposing to comment: 
the crisis of the system breaks out when trade-
union power, in the course of the democratiza-
tion process, competes with the upper strata for 
the distribution of the surplus. To this competi-
tion a limit is set by equality between the 
growth rate of the surplus and the growth rate of 
the product; once this limit is passed, the upper 
strata use their economic power to raise prices 
and invoke monetary expedients to make the 
increase possible. 
The result is social inflation which allows 
the surplus to be restored to its usual size; and 
as the distribution struggle becomes in-
creasingly conflictive, the inflationary spiral 
gathers momentum and the chaotic state of so-
cial behaviour leads to the use of force. 
This outline interpretation, which cer-
tainly does not do justice to the many nuances 
present in Prebisch's reasoning, nevertheless 
affords a useful opportunity to note the follow-
ing points: in the first place, the social protago-
nists of the crisis are confined to two major 
groups called trade-union power and upper 
strata (if a different terminology is adopted, ref-
erence may be made to the social conflict be-
tween proletariat and bourgeoisie), to which 
two economic categories correspond - wages 
and surplus; secondly, in the dynamics of the 
conflict, it is trade-union power that takes the 
initiative in attack; the upper strata will adopt a 
defensive strategy (even the use of force will be 
merely defensive), once the limit in question 
has been reached. 
(a) The two foregoing observations imply, 
in my opinion, two incorrect simplifications. 
Let us begin with that relating to the social 
protagonists. Of course, the class struggle can-
not be excluded from the study of political 
events in Latin America, especially in the 
countries of the Southern Cone, where trade-
union power has attained significant dimen-
sions. But from this neccesary association an 
interpretation of political processes, including 
crises in systems, cannot be linearly derived. 
Suffice it here to note that in several Southern-
Cone countries interbourgeois conflicts have 
dominated political events in recent years; nei-
ther the triumph of the Unidad Popular in Chi-
le in 1970, nor the upsurge of Peronism in 1973, 
can be understood without reference to the 
clash of interests between sectors of the bour-
geoisie. It may even be said that some charac-
teristics of the accumulation process in the 
countries concerned, which actively exacer-
bated these interbourgeois conflicts, might 
shed light on the radicalization of broad sectors 
of the petty and middle bourgeoisie. We are al-
luding particularly, in the first place, to the rap-
id process of capitalist centralization which led 
to the social disruption of large segments of the 
domestic entrepreneurial sector; in Argentina, 
foi example, the number of employers in indus-
try decreased by over 50%, and similarly that of 
employers in agriculture and business dropped 
sharply, while the 1970 census shows a marked 
fall in the number of own-account workers in 
industry and agriculture. Secondly, employ-
ment difficulties also affected middle-class 
sectors, despite the increase in professional 
jobs in the State and services sectors (espe-
cially in the services with a capitalist content); 
as a result, employment opportunities, or earn-
ings, fell short of the demands and aspirations 
of some of the social sectors in the middle 
strata. 
These observations are important because 
in Prebisch's text manifestations of violence 
seem to come from the lower strata, and no 
mention is made of the extent to which middle-
class sectors have called the capitalist State in 
question, both from the ideological standpoint 
and through concrete political action. The 
omission of the interbourgeois conflicts also 
implies overlooking the fact that the first armed 
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encounters in Argentina —taking them as indi-
cators of violence and of the crisis of democratic 
ways of life— occurred between segments of 
the army. 
It is true that some allusions are made in 
Prebisch's text to the conflicts to which I am 
referring, but they figure in connexion with an 
explanation of traditional inflation, and are 
never finally incorporated into the line of rea-
soning concerned with the crisis of the system. 
(b) T h e second simplification is that which 
attributes to the upper strata a purely defensive 
strategy. And herein, in my opinion, lies the 
origin of the restricted conception of the 
surplus as it emerges from the text under dis-
cussion. 
It should be noted that the surplus is not, as 
in classical theory, the difference between 
value and wages; or, expressed in more con-
ventional terms, the difference between the 
price of output and the cost of producing it. 
According to the text, the surplus is the pro-
ductivity increment resulting from technical 
progress and not diverted to wages because of 
the structural heterogeneity that operates 
through the labour market. It is a substream of 
the value added which the upper strata appro-
priate by virtue of capitalist production rela-
tions;, we insist that it does not constitute the 
whole of the value added which is distributed 
as profits, interest or income. This is not an 
arbitrary interpretation of the text; otherwise, 
there would be no foundation for that critical 
limit in the system which is represented by the 
point where the rate of increase of wages be-
comes identical with the growth rate of pro-
ductivity. 
This theoretical proposition poses some 
problems when an attempt is made to reconcile 
it with empirical evidence. Inasmuch as the 
growth of real wages would be subordinate to 
the rate of increase of productivity, some cor-
respondence between the historical trends of 
the two variables might be expected; for exam-
ple, that the rate of increase of productivity 
should push wages upwards, while the expla-
nation of the difference between the trends of 
the two variables would lie in the structural 
heterogeneity that trade-union power fails to 
offset. Another problem stems from the fact that 
this theoretical approach excludes the possi-
bility of significant reductions in real wages 
until the critical limit is reached (the use of 
power first, and of force later, by the upper 
strata would squeeze wages only when they 
exceeded that limit). 
By way of example, I adduce the following 
empirical evidence; in Argentina, between 
1950 and 1970 global productivity in the indus-
trial sector increased by about 140%; average 
wages in industry rose by approximately 30%. 
Such a difference cannot be explained by refer-
ence to structural heterogeneity, nor can the 
importance of trade-union power be under-
estimated. In addition, therefore, account must 
be taken of the action of political variables in 
order to understand not only the changes be-
tween the beginning and end years but the 
changes during subperiods. And the action of 
political variables would seem to stem not only 
from the difficulties of the global accumulation 
process, but also from the acerbity of inter-
bourgeois conflicts. 
On several occasions, during the period 
1959-1972, a disposition to take the offensive 
must be recognized in certain segments of the 
upper strata which, in 1959 using all the extra-
economic coercion of the State, appropriated 
the labour value (almost 30%); and which took 
further steps in the same direction, and with 
different results, in 1962, 1966 and 1972. It is 
true that during the period in question trade-
union power launched political offensives, but 
on the economic level it had no other alter-
native than to try to regain positions. 
This offensive attitude on the part of the 
upper strata is connected with their internal 
conflicts, and particularly with the charac-
teristics of the industrialization process: 
Given the relative inefficiency of the new 
durable consumer goods industries (comparing 
the international ratio between production pri-
ces and average wages with the corresponding 
domestic ratio), the lower strata have no access 
to the markets concerned, which can be ex-
panded only in so far as the surplus is basically 
appropriated by the upper and middle strata. 
Once the initial stages of import substitution 
have been completed in these markets, their 
subsequent expansion implies the adoption of 
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decisions that affect the entire surplus, not 
merely that component which derives from the 
productivity increment; 
Given the relative inefficiency prevailing 
in the intermediate and capital goods indus-
tries, progress in the import substitution 
process implies comparatively higher costs; 
hence one and the same rate of monetary saving 
presupposes lower rates of real accumulation. 
The aim of keeping wages down and possibly 
even lowering them still farther is to get rid of 
the negative effects on real investment re-
sulting from the structural characteristics of the 
import substitution process. 
Hence it may be maintained that neither 
theoretically nor empirically are wage ceilings 
as high as is assumed in Prebisch's text, ac-
cording to which these ceilings are fixed by the 
rate of increase of productivity. Rather are they 
related to the periodical redefinition of global 
accumulation processes. And this perspective 
requires as its basis a more classical notion of 
the economic surplus concept. 
Why this revisionist interpretation of the 
concept of surplus in the article on which we 
are commenting? To account for it we suggest 
the following two reasons. In this text not much 
attention is paid to the specific and increasing 
difficulties in the structure of production re-
sulting from progress in import substitution, 
and their implications as regards the size of the 
surplus required to sustain steady rates of eco-
nomic activity. In addition, a concept of the 
surplus springing from social production rela-
tions is replaced by another springing from 
technical production relations. The latter, in its 
turn, stems from an ideological a priori ac-
cording to which it would be the surplus and 
not the means of production that would have to 
be socialized in the period of transition or trans-
formation. 
3. In chapter II of the study under discus-
sion, in connexion with the surplus other deri-
vations emerge which call for additional com-
ments , in particular, the arguments accounting 
for the retention of the surplus by the upper 
strata. In the end it is the surplus retention 
mechanism that explains why this category is 
not a temporary phenomenon, destined to dis-
appear in the course of inter-capital compe-
tition, but is a permanent feature of every ex-
panding reproduction process. 
Prebisch maintains, in the last analysis, that 
the surplus is retained because prices rigidly 
resist a decrease when productivity is increas-
ing. Logically, if prices behave like this, given 
constant monetary wages (although this as-
sumption is not absolutely necessary), the 
surplus will be retained in its entirety by the 
owners of the means of production. 
But this price rigidity calls for an explana-
tion in its turn; according to the one offered in 
the text, demand for capital goods and labour in 
an expanding reproduction process generates 
the income that is absorbed by the supply re-
sulting from preceding production circuits. 
The monetary authority, with its regulatory 
ability within the spontaneous play of market 
laws, will furnish the means of payment where-
by the demand in question can be made 
effective. 
In barest outline, our critical comments on 
this explanation are as follows: 
(a) The argument relating to the retention 
of the surplus is equivalent to formulating a 
theory of prices for a system in process of 
growth in which, in addition, productivity 
increments are taking place. In this context, "if 
prices do not fall in accordance with rising pro-
ductivity, and in so far as the latter is not corre-
Iatively reflected in higher earnings, the reason 
is to be found in the expansion of demand gen-
erated in the circuits that are to increase future 
production". Which is tantamount to saying 
that if demand expands in real terms suffi-
ciently to absorb the real increase in supply, 
productivity increments will be reflected in a 
rise in the rate of profits. The question to be 
elucidated is whether the rigidity of prices 
results from phenomena appearing in the com-
modities market, or from specific behaviour 
patterns in the earnings of the factors of pro-
duction (wages and profits). Unquestionably, 
for Prebisch the explanation of this price ri-
gidity is to be found in the commodities market, 
and to support this contention he has to resort to 
a normative proposition: "The growth of in-
come and the corresponding monetary expan-
sion generate demand which must be at least 
sufficient to absorb the final goods emerging, 
augmented by the productivity increment, if 
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this increment is not to be reflected in a fall in 
pr ices" (p. 192; the italics are the commen-
tator's). 
(b) If Marxist terminology is adopted, the 
process of expanding reproduction of global 
capital in the economic system can be ex-
pressed as follows: 
M - C ... P . . .C , — M' — C\... P ... C" 
T h e monetary authority regulates the expan-
sion of the means of payment so that capital in 
the form of commodities (C' t) can be converted 
into capital in the form of money (M'), a conver-
sion which is possible in so far as expanded 
reproduction of the production process occurs 
(C ' 2 > C). And the monetary authority inter-
venes in that part of the capital circulation 
process indicated by C , — M' — C 2 . But what 
is C ' L ? It is the economic units' demand for 
money at the close of the current production 
cycle; a demand for money which permits the 
realization of the surplus value. If the produc-
tivity increments were partly transferred to 
prices, the economic units' demand for money 
would be less than in the case of productivity 
increments reflected entirely in profits. Hence 
the problem of price behaviour in a growing 
economy cannot be viewed independently of 
the structure of production (degrees of capi-
talist concentration and centralization in the 
production markets), and reduced to a question 
of global commodity demand and suplply. In 
any expanding reproduction process the mone-
tary authority can regulate the means of pay-
ment so as to accomodate the enterprises' poli-
cies in respect of prices and utilization of pro-
duction capacity. But in a structure of produc-
tion in which various degrees of monopoly 
exist in the different commodity markets, price 
policy will have more to do with the plans for 
utilization of production capacity in the leading 
enterprises, and with the aim of keeping new 
enterprises out of the market. Of course the 
monetary authority can make mistakes in its 
regulation of the means of payment; if it over-
estimates, prices will tend to rise; if it under-
estimates, inventories will tend to pile up, and 
enterprises will have to revise their price or 
production policy. But these are questions 
relating to the economic cycle and not to a 
system with a propensity to growth. 
Moreover, this approach to the problem of 
price rigidity, attaching particular weight to the 
question of demand in commodity markets, is 
another way of analysing earnings outside the 
framework of concrete social relations in the 
sphere of production; a point to which we have 
already drawn attention in our critique of the 
'surplus ' category. 
4. We will now concentrate on Prebisch's 
observations on the crisis of capitalism and its 
" leading dynamic centre". They incorporate a 
lucid argument as to why the consumer society 
in the central countries has had a negative 
effect on environment and has depleted natural 
resources, in particular petroleum. It is true 
that the need to remedy those effects on the 
environment and to resort to new sources of 
energy will compel the central countries to 
increase their efforts to overcome the present 
crisis in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms, since this crisis cannot be described in 
terms of economic indicators alone; the invest-
ment which those efforts will entail will not 
have an immediate impact of the productivity 
of labour, measured in capitalist terms. The ne-
cessity of meeting these challenges, however, 
is superimposed upon the economic crisis of 
the capitalist system but is not its underlying 
cause. Petroleum prices were put up by the 
producer countries in 1974, and it is likewise 
true that throughout the 1970s an ever-growing 
body of public opinion has been exerting poli-
tical pressure for defence of the environment. 
The first symptoms of the economic crisis to 
which we shall be referring in greater detail 
became apparent at the end of the 1960s, and it 
was officially recognized in the devaluation of 
the dollar by the Nixon administration in 1971. 
According to the text under review, there are 
two indicators of the crisis in the central coun-
tries: stagnation and inflation. We will now 
attempt a further look at them, keeping to the 
sequence of Prebisch's ideas. 
(a) Stagnation results from a decline in the 
growth rate of average productivity in the 
system. The factors accounting for this decline 
would appear to be, firstly, an increasing homo-
genization of the structure of production which 
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reduces the possibilities of a marginal increase 
in productivity when production strata using 
inferior techniques are superseded; secondly, 
the fact that while the consumer society 
implies the development of branches of pro-
duction to satisfy the consumption of high-
income sectors, much of the investment in such 
branches is aimed at stepping up the efficiency 
of the goods rather than productivity; lastly, 
expenditure on armaments, to which should be 
added expenditure on the space industry. Here 
Prebisch notes a certain ambiguity in respect of 
which we share his opinion: it would be a mis-
take to underestimate the effects on labour pro-
ductivity resulting from the incorporation of 
certain technological innovations generated in 
the munitions and space industries into the 
processes of production of capital and con-
sumer goods. 
Not only is the size of the surplus affected 
by the aforesaid trend in the average produc-
tivity of the system, but it is also subject to 
pressure deriving from the rise in salaries and 
wages and in State expenditure. 
The term ' pressure ' suggests the follow-
ing comment: in some growth models, like that 
of Kalecki, the tendency is for the public deficit 
to sustain the bulk of earnings. How would it be 
possible to counteract*the trend towards capi-
talist overproduction, given the great develop-
ment of the forces of production, and how could 
the surplus value be realized, if no demand 
additional to that of the capitalists and workers 
existed? Some items of public expenditure, in 
particular the public sector's contribution to 
military outlays and to the space industry, 
allow some sectors of production, and certain 
enterprises in particular, to enjoy high rates of 
profit. Of course the production resources con-
nected with those industries imply a use of the 
surplus divorced from other productive uses, 
but these latter do not necessarily correspond 
to a capitalist concept of rationality. 
(b) Inflation is explained in the text by ref-
erence to the pressure of trade-union power for 
wage increases, which are transferred to costs; 
by the increase in the public deficit; and by the 
energy crisis and the protection of the environ-
ment, factors whose addition to those previ-
ously mentioned multiplies the original impe-
tus of the first two. 
In this connexion I have a reservation to 
make with regard to the importance of the first 
variable, since wage increases would have re-
percussions on unit costs if they exceeded the 
increase in labour productivity. 
Stagnation and inflation are not the only 
indicators, since Prebisch suggests thatanother 
e lement in the world crisis consists in the 
weakness that the United States is displaying 
as the leading centre of the capitalist system, 
with its effects on international economic rela-
tions. But the inflationary element is brought to 
the fore again as the chief factor accounting for 
that weakness, and study of the differential 
behaviour of the variables underlying stagna-
tion in the central countries is not incorporated 
into the analysis. 
5. In the following paragraphs we are pro-
posing to attempt a historical relativization of 
the importance of these indicators, both in 
order to work out a more satisfactory descrip-
tion of the present juncture, and in order to 
pursue interpretation along another tentative 
path. 
Let us first define the characteristics of the 
1930 crisis: 
(i) a sudden crash and overproduction 
crisis in the United States wich were 
propagated to the rest of the world; 
(ii) extremely high unemployment rates 
and a fall in prices; 
(iii) immediate defence mechanisms adopt-
ed by the central countries: tariff" mea-
sures, multiple exchange rates, dis-
criminatory trade practices, etc.; 
(iv) crisis in theoretical capacity to resolve 
the economic crisis; 
(v) serious reduction of prices of raw ma-
terials from the peripheral countries. 
The characteristics of the present juncture, 
in relation to 1930, could be outlined as 
follows: 
(i) less unemployment; 
(ii) international1 forums (IMF, summit 
meetings and others) where these 
problems are discussed; 
(iii) high levels of inflation, with their cor-
responding psychological and eco-
nomic cots, but not a price decline; 
(iv) theoretical inadequacies, but not a 
crisis; it is known in theory what can 
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and must be done, but there is social 
and political opposition to its imple-
mentation. 
Our main hypothesis is that the present 
crisis is one of hegemony in the world capi-
talist system and, consequently, one of regu-
lation of the system in question. This crisis of 
hegemony has a bearing both on the central 
countr ies ' interrelationships, and on their rela-
tions with the peripheral countries. Our argu-
ment will be concerned with the former, al-
though admittedly a complete explanation en-
tails dealing with the latter. 
In the first place, a few historical refe-
rences must be cited. 
The hegemony of the United States was 
officially formalized at Bretton Woods. There 
the rules of the game which were to govern 
world capitalist expansion in general, and that 
of the United States in particular, were defi-
nitely settled. I speak of the expansion of the 
capitalist world in general, because even the 
countries which emerged from the conflict as 
debtors knew that the enormous credits they 
received from the United States had to be 
paid for with exports. There was no other way 
out, and this one presupposed rapid expansion 
at t he world level and, therefore, the removal of 
obstacles to trade. 
T h e Bretton Woods arrangements worked 
especially well for the United States, whose 
vast production potential needed markets in 
order to earn profits. This was at the root of the 
insistence, in the course of the negotiations, on 
the elimination of discriminatory trade prac-
tices, particularly those of the British Common-
wealth; of the concern to establish fixed ex-
change rates in order to prevent unexpected 
and repeated devaluations from blotting out 
with a stroke of the monetary pen the real com-
parative advantages of the hegemonic centre; 
the imposition of the dollar standard —the 
dollar being then a currency in short supply— 
as a means whereby the United States would be 
able to regulate the world money supply. (No 
country could take out dollar loans for a sum 
larger than that of its own .contributions, and all 
the countries in the aggregate could not borrow 
sums exceeding the United States' contribu-
tion, unless certain special credits were con-
certed directly with the United States adminis-
tration, which would entail certain political 
and economic concessions.} 
During the first few years in which the IMF 
agreements were in force the currencies of the 
most important European countries were over-
valued. Subsequently, the Fund had to autho-
rize various devaluations in the European 
countries; in this, of course, were represented 
not only the interests of the national govern-
ments involved, but also those of the rapidly 
expanding transnational corporations in need 
of markets, including that of the United States. 
This remark is a useful pointer to the tre-
mendous effort which must have been made in 
Europe and Japan to enable the trade surplus to 
cover external debt servicing. I am excluding 
here the inflow of dollars for political reasons 
(the cold war and the active hostilities in Korea 
and Vietnam), but at all events the dollar start-
ed to become a currency in plentiful supply for 
structurally economic reasons at the end of the 
1960s, when for the first time the trade balance 
of the United States showed a deficit. 
It is important to underline this problem of 
the growth of differential productivities in 
order to explain the present situation; and it 
seems to me useful, because in Prebisch's text 
the United States' trade deficit is seen as the 
result of internal inflationary pressures. The 
alternative interpretation we have outlined 
does not contradict the text under discussion, 
but suggests that the relative weight of the two 
explanations needs investigating somewhat 
more closely, a study which would necessitate, 
inter alia, working out indicators of produc-
tivity, wage increases, public expenditure and 
other contributory variables. At this point, I 
adduce the following argument, which is not, to 
be sure, conclusive proof: a comparative analy-
sis of the current trade balance between the 
United States and Japan shows the former ex-
porting raw materials and foodstuffs to the 
latter, and importing from it capital and durable 
consumer goods. Inflation —a generalized rise 
in prices— would not account for this reci-
procal export and import structure. 
Theory tells us what should be done. Ac-
cording to economic theory, countries with a 
trade-balance surplus and unemployment (as is 
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the case with Germany and Japan) should re-
value their currencies and apply an expan-
sionist fiscal and monetary policy. Prebisch 
maintains that expansionist policies of this kind 
are inhibited by fear of inflation, but in saying 
so he forgets the effects of the exchange rate, 
adjustment of which in the direction indicated 
might offset pressure on price levels, including 
the pressure of the labour force. 
What happens is that in a Kaleckian mo-
del trade-balance equilibrium always means 
smaller profits; and the European and Japanese 
bourgeoisies are as unlikely to put up with this 
as are the transnational corporations operating 
in the countries in question. Similarly, trade-
balance equilibrium reduces financing for 
those countries' investments abroad, which 
compete with United States' investment both 
for markets and for raw materials. 
In theory, a country in the position of the 
United States ought to devalue its currency and 
adjust its monetary and fiscal policy so as to 
1. I am in full agreement with Raúl Prebisch 
both as regards his criticism that the arguments 
of neoclassical theory were evolved "in the 
void, outside time and space", which consti-
tutes a very serious limitation of their explan-
atory force, and with respect to the necessity of 
taking into account social structures and their 
historical evolution in economic theories. 
2. Since he adopts the position, with which I 
am likewise in full accord, that real wages are 
fixed not in accordance with marginal produc-
tivities, but by the bargaining power of the 
labour force in the various 'layers of techno-
logy', he sould avoid the use of this concept. 
The basic theoretical —and practical— reason 
for rejecting the concept of marginal produc-
tivity in the mechanized part of the economy is 
that machines operate efficiently in fixed pro-
portion to labour (perfectly determined by 
technological considerations), so that over the 
short term (with given equipment) it is impos-
sible to increase production by increasing the 
labour input. The marginal productivity of 
labour is nil and therefore neoclassical rea-
p re vent excessive pressure on the labour 
market. But how could the United States de-
value its currency and cause a tremendous re-
distribution of the wealth (measured in Euro-
dollars and petrodollars) in the hands of the 
Central Banks and, what is more, of trans-
national corporations? It would be tantamount 
to confiscation. Besides, what strength can a go-
vernment have which is not capable of taxing 
the transnational oil corporations' excess pro-
fits? Hence it is that the United States, shackled 
by its monetary orthodoxy, which is largely that 
of Bretton Woods, resorts to raising the rate of 
interest and to the application of monetary re-
strictions. No doubt a higher rate of interest 
will serve the purpose of tapping capital over 
the short term (speculation in gold has been to 
some extent brought under control); but this 
measure will have inflationary repercussions, 
and obviously does not attack the causes of the 
decline in the country's average productivity in 
relative terms. 
soning and instruments are inapplicable. 
Hence the failure of policies consisting in 
lowering real wages ir order to step up employ-
ment! All that is achieved by this is to reduce 
the wage earners' demand, with the ensuing 
decl ine in production and employment. 
Similarly, he misinterprets neoclassical 
theory with respect to the distribution of the 
enterprises ' operational surplus between 'pro-
fits' and entrepreneurial earnings. 
If, in accordance with the theory in ques-
tion process, is to pay the interest on this capital 
out of" the surplus consisting in the 'earnings' 
sumption is that those who own the capital lend 
it to the entrepreneur at a specific (long-term) 
rate of interest, either through bank loans or by 
the issue of bonds. One of the entrepreneur's 
first obligations, on completion of the produc-
tion process, is to pay the interest on this capital 
out of the surplus consisting in the 'earnings' 
accruing to him, which can be interpreted as a 
form of remuneration for his work and entre-
preneurial skill; but which are of a contingent 
character. It is these 'earnings' that would tend 
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to disappear through competition; on the other 
hand, the emoluments of the owners of capital 
(in the shape of interest) would be assured. 
In my opinion, Prebisch defines the con-
cept of surplus in different ways in his articles, 
which leads to confusion. The broadest (and 
most comprehensive) definition is to be found 
in the first article: "The surplus comprises the 
profits of enterprises, the interest paid on capi-
tal, and amortization of fixed capital. Through 
appropriation of the surplus, the owners of the 
means of production achieve primary appro-
priation of the fruits of technical progress".1 
I should like, however, to point out the 
difference between this definition and the 
Marxist concept of surplus value. An initial dif-
ference lies in the fact that 'surplus value' does 
not include amortization of fixed capital. Sec-
ondly, there is a difference between the two 
concepts as regards the measurement of magni-
tude: that of 'surplus value' is measured in 
units of work, in accordance with Marxist Val-
ues', and the surplus by values 'converted into 
prices'. 
At all events, the two explanations are sim-
ilar in their origin, which lies in a social struc-
ture based on the ownership of the means of 
production and on the power relations between 
the wage-earners and the owners of the means 
of production. The way in which the surplus is 
appropriated is also similar in essence to that 
described in Marx's theory. It is mechanization 
that makes it possible to increase both labour 
productivity and the monetary value of output 
per worker. In so far as the owners of the means 
of production can take on workers at wages 
similar to those they were earning when they 
were engaged in artisanal production (or using 
machinery with a lower level of labour produc-
tivity), a surplus (or plus-value) is produced, 
which is appropriated by the owners of capital. 
The surplus (or plus-value) decreases in so far 
as the workers are strong enough to obtain in-
creases in real wages, or in so far as competition 
steps up supply, because new owners of capital 
adopt more highly mechanized techniques, 
and that leads to price reductions. 
1
 "A critique of peripheral capitalism", CEPAL Re-
view, First Semester 1976, p. 37, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
4. Let us now take a look at the problems raised 
by the generation and the 'persistence' of the 
surplus in the hands of the owners of capital 
and its failure to disappear as a result of the fall 
in prices that should be produced by competi-
tion, as Raúl Prebisch explains in his articles. 
With regard to the generation of the 'sur-
plus', I agree as to the importance of taking into 
account in the dynamic analysis the time cover-
ed by the production circuit from its primary 
phase up to the sale of the goods on the market; 
although I would add that the duration of the 
production circuit includes the time taken for 
the investment to mature. I think, however, 
that once the wage-earners fail to save (or at all 
events dissave), the investment required for 
growth must be entirely financed by the own-
ers of capital through the current production 
process, and, therefore, its cost is transferred to 
current prices; this is why they do not fall (and 
even rise), and it is this that constitutes the 
principal mechanism for the generation of the 
surplus. 
The reduction in wage-earners' demand 
due to the fact that employment increases less 
than production, because of the higher labour 
productivity of the most recent investment 
—that is already productive— is offset by the 
equivalent increase in the surplus, which could 
bring down the prices of the goods primarily 
consumed by wage-earners and push up those 
of the goods primarily consumed by the owners 
of capital. 
In my view, prices of wage goods do not 
fall for several reasons: because of the exis-
tence and expansion of the system of sales on 
credit; because of the highly oligopolical 
nature of the markets; and because the general-
ization of the new techniques with higher 
labour productivity takes too long a time, owing 
to the rigidity introduced into the combinations 
of factors by the technologically fixed propor-
tions characterizing the older equipment. The 
need to maintain margins of profit in accor-
dance with the oldest installed capacity 
—which is predominant in volume— prevents 
prices from falling and keeps up the size of the 
surplus over long periods in new enterprises 
where labour productivity is higher. 
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Comments by PedroVuskovic 
T h e articles by Raúl Prebisch constitute a com-
plete and well-knit system of interpretation, 
des igned to remedy two weaknesses existing in 
earlier versions: they seek to go more deeply 
into the 'specificities' of dependent capitalism, 
where this is virgin ground; and they aim at 
explicitly introducing the political dimension 
of the development process, in its twofold role 
of conditioning factor and consequence. 
A first critical remark I venture to make is 
that their content is on two formally integrated 
but in fact dissociated planes. One is the plane 
of diagnosis, of interpretation, in respect of 
which there is clear technical substantiation of 
what is discussed and concluded. Hence the 
denunciat ion of the system is derived as an 
objective conclusion; and for that very reason, 
with a forcefulness which is not invalidated by 
certain partial doubts or objections that might 
be raised. The other plane, touched upon in the 
analytical study and more fully explored in 
"Towards a theory of change", is that of propo-
sitions. Here there is a difference; these prop-
ositions neither derive from the analysis nor are 
supported by it. It is as if after concluding his 
diagnosis with a categorical denunciation, the 
author feels obliged to offer a reply; but this 
does not stem from the analysis; it is valua-
tional, 'ideological', and, consequently, does 
not carry the same conviction. Oí course he has 
every right to put forward his propositions, but 
in this case they are not backed up by the pre-
ceding analysis and cannot be discussed in the 
light of it. 
T h e implication is that, with this reserva-
tion, what is pertinent and opportune is to dis-
cuss the analytical and interpretative content, 
independent ly of the normative propositions 
which are added (not deduced). In this con-
nexion three observations seem relevant: 
(a) On the evaluation of external factors 
The impression is formed that he under-
estimates the relative weight of external fac-
tors, and also that his approach is somewhat 
unilateral as regards the direction of causality 
relations; for example: 
— he recognizes the "siphoning-off of 
peripheral income", but at no time suggests its 
relative importance vis-à-vis the 'surplus'; 
— he acknowledges the weightiness of 
the part played by the transnational corpora-
tions, but asserts that they "could not assume so 
important a role in the periphery without the 
privileged-consumer society"; or that they 
"would not find such fertile soil ... if no such 
social aberration of peripheral capitalism oc-
curred"; 
— the responsibility of the centres that he 
admits is a "responsibility for co-operation" (?); 
— he recognizes that "new forms of de-
pendence emerge", but adds that "depen-
dence has its counterpart in financial co-opera-
tion"; 
— he utters a warning that 'dependence' 
must not be confused with 'periphery'; nor 
should 'underdevelopment ' be attributed to 
'dependence ' ; he describes as 'extravagant' the 
idea that "the prosperity of the centres is due to 
the siphoning-off of income from the periph-
ery", and, on the contrary, suggests that greater 
importance attaches to the "immeasurable 
scientific, technological and cultural legacy 
inherited by the periphery". 
Although each of these assertions would 
be sustainable per se, taken as a whole they 
form a line of argument which is dubious at 
least, and to make matters worse, in the later 
part of the article these 'external factors' are 
ultimately left out of the discussion of future 
options altogether. 
(b) On the dynamic potential which the sys-
tem is assumed to recover through the use 
of force 
An explanation is duly given of the role of 
force when the 'distribution struggle' sweeps 
the system along to 'critical limits' (a key con-
cept throughout the argument). But it is as-
sumed that through the use of force 'dynamic 
potential ' is automatically restored (irrespec-
tive of the 'social costs' involved). The article is 
indeed sprinkled with assertions such as: "Un-
questionably, the re-establishment of the dy-
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namies of the system entails a significant social 
cost, in addition to the huge political cost incur-
red by the use of force". What is more, ac-
cording to the degree of severity of the pay 
squeeze , the suggestion is made that "it may 
even be possible to succeed in raising the rate 
of capital accumulation, and therefore the rate 
of development , above that prevailing before 
the system's critical limit was passed". 
T h e political implication of such an asser-
tion is at the very least uncomfortable; it would 
seem to augur significantly dynamic prospects 
in situations like those imposed in the South-
ern Zone. Fortunately, it is not only uncomfort-
able , but also disputable and, of course, not 
proven in the article! For example, it might be 
answered with another hypothetical proposi-
tion: regressive income distribution allows the 
critical limit to be overstepped, but in such 
conditions the dynamic prospects encounter a 
relatively low 'ceiling', — a proposition which 
at least seems to be in keeping with concrete 
experiences of recent date. Perhaps it might 
even be possible to justify a more hazardous 
proposition: approximation to the critical point 
also meets a requirement of the dynamism of 
the system; any move away from it, therefore, 
can be only temporary, and to no great distance. 
T h e crisis of the system is more definitive, 
since the use of force does not re-establish dy-
namism and only makes it possible to keep the 
system going on the very verges of its critical 
frontiers. And should this be the case, it would 
have political importance and political implica-
tions with respect not only to the economic 
horizon of régimes of force, but also to alterna-
tive options: that is, as regards the viability of 
the so-called 'liberal' reconstitutions of democ-
racy. 
(c) On the position of the middle strata and 
their relation to other strata of workers 
Over and over again Raúl Prebisch identi-
fies the increasing capacity of the disadvan-
taged labour force to share in the fruits of 
higher productivity with the rise of the 'middle 
strata', basing his argument on the distribution 
struggle between these strata and the 'recipi-
ents of the surplus'. More than one piece of 
empirical evidence would raise a query as to 
whether those are the exact terms of the prob-
lem. 
For example, in Chile in 1970, the wealth-
iest 20% of the population was made up as 
follows: 6.6% by employers, 21.2% by own-
account workers, and 62.4% and 9.8% by white-
collar and blue-collar workers, respectively; in 
turn, that segment comprised 82.9% of the em-
ployers, 17.6% of the own-account workers and 
45.9% and 3.9% of the white-collar and blue-
collar workers, respectively. These are figures 
which would warrant our thinking in somewhat 
different terms: for example, putting forward 
the hypothesis that the rise of the 'middle 
strata' affects the surplus much less and the 
income of the lower strata much more. 
In such conditions, the rise of the middle 
strata would be functional to the system and its 
dynamics and not contradictory with it (for 
market expansion reasons); there would be no 
struggle, but complicity between the strata in 
question and the upper strata. The major prob-
lem is posed by the other, the lower 'strata' ; it is 
the power of these that leads to the crisis of the 
system (in contrast, the author maintains that 
"the lower strata have very little share... in the 
participation process"). And if they are 'protag-
onists of dissidence', as Prebisch calls them, it 
is precisely because they come to realize the 
limits of their function as 'political and trade-
union protagonists'. 
Reasoning of this kind raises at least one 
point of'reasonable doubt'. The problem is that 
ifit is well-founded, it cannot but influence the 
nature of the options identified in the article 
and underlying the 'theory of change'. 
Lastly, our comments relate particularly to 
Prebisch's theses on the trends of capitalism in 
the centres. 
In his approach to this subject there is a 
relevant point of departure: on the one hand, he 
points out that international capitalism is faced 
with enormous accumulation requirements 
(the challenge of natural resources and protec-
tion of the environment, new advances in tech-
nology); and, on the other hand, he notes the 
existence of a labour which in the centres 
"has acquired great trade-union and political 
power" and exerts severe pressure on the sur-
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plus. In short, giant requirements and dwarfed 
capacity to meet them. 
Henceforward, however, the subsequent 
conduct of his argument is not in keeping with 
what he recognizes to be the dimension of 
these problems; it stays on a relatively conven-
tional plane, and that is not enough. 
Furthermore, doubts are raised by some 
specific partial aspects of his reasoning: thus, 
for example, the terms in which he expresses 
the concept of an organic decline in productivi-
ty, which can only be understood to mean "a 
decl ine in the rate of increase"; or the fact that 
h e makes no reference whatever to the implica-
tions of ever keener inter-capitalist competi-
tion 
But most important of all is his key ap-
proach, according to which the crisis in the 
centres, in essence, would have to be resolved 
within the centres themselves; despite which 
its effects would certainly make themselves felt 
in the periphery. Over against this proposition, 
there would at least be room for one hypothe-
sis: the answers to this crisis will largely spring 
from a substantive redefinition of relations 
with the periphery. 
Recent times have seen the emergence of a 
whole line of analysis and thinking in this di-
rection, of which nothing whatever is said in 
Prebisch's article, and which points to highly 
relevant and profound phenomena that might 
very substantially change the picture of the 
world capitalist economy and would be des-
tined to have enormous repercussions on the 
direction of internal change. In point of fact, 
processes like 'industrial redeployment', the 
extension of 'industrial free zones' or the ex-
pansion of're-export industries', which suggest 
new patterns of international-scale accumula-
tion based on more intensive or more direct 
utilization of the dependent areas 'cheap la-
bour', cannot be ignored or underestimated; 
apart from the fact that they have already con-
founded the 'demands of the periphery' with 
basic interests of international capitalism, and 
given a decidedly equivocal significance to the 
propositions relating to the 'new international 
economic order'. 
